Restraint in Foreign Policy

The restraint school of foreign policy wants the US to do less, and spend less, in foreign affairs.

A significant minority of the foreign policy establishment is trying to turn the tables on half a century of global expansion. Calling for restraint and retrenchment, (though shying away from "retreat"), they argue that we are spending too much and are overextended. What made sense in the hot and cold wars of the last century make less sense now, and indeed generates resentment and antagonism. A recent book by Peter Harris tries to make this case, though it has several defects. First, it uses a lot of loaded language like garrison and occupation, where our overseas bases do not function this way at all. Second, he does not really spend much time actually making the case for restraint, but assumes its logic and spends most of the book whining about why no one- not the foreign policy establishment, not the military-industrial complex, not the US congress, and not even the voters(!) are on board with this new and exciting movement in foreign policy. In despair, Harris veers off into domestic policy, the virtues of ranked choice voting, women's empowerment, and multi-party democracy as the golden keys enabling restraint in foreign policy to finally, some day in the future, to get a proper hearing.

The weird thing is how this community has chosen to frame its movement. Doing less, letting China run things for a change... it is not at all clear why retreat, restraint, and retrenchment would be either attractive or wise policy. We need to take a big step back and consider why we have foreign policy at all. Any nation tries to gain and keep as much power as it can. It tries to shape the international landscape in its interests, hopefully in the most far-seeing way possible. Those are the touchstones of any foreign policy. Claiming to want less power and less reach in the world is simply an intuitive non-starter. The US ended World War 2 as the most powerful nation and remains that at least up to the current administration, in all significant metrics- soft power, military power, and economic power. We need to nurture and preserve these powers for our own sake, and also for that of the system which we are the general sponsors of. As Harris points out, the international institutions that we founded after World War 2 were wonderful, but not very powerful. They were not up to the task of serious policing, and the US took on that role, as the global policeman. With a highly intermittent, sometimes irresponsible, and generally very light touch, we have been the only ones who can knock heads with anyone, any time, while also promoting stability, trade, and the expansion of democratic systems. This environment that we have shaped has been beneficial, for us and for many others around the world. The axis arrayed against us today is significant, but not very large, composed mostly of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, plus a few others like Afghanistan, maybe some of the central Asian nations.

An important additional principle of foreign relations is that there are many audiences involved. Other leaders are far from our only target when we show who we are by how we speak and use our power abroad. We seek to promote human rights and democracy to all people, everywhere. We seek to deter aggression from any number of entities, including terrorist organizations of all sizes up to states. The landscape is very complex, so we need to have many tools, and balance those tools carefully. This leads to a totally different framing of the restraint theme in foreign policy.

Take a look at the following diagram. This is a map of the military bases that we have all over the world. Better than all the platitudes those in favor of restraint put out, this one image speaks volumes about how distended one aspect of our foreign policy has become.

This begs belief. At a time when we have technological reach to anywhere and at any time, we have carved out little islands of America in eighty countries. We have over a hundred bases each in Germany and Japan. Maybe in the decade after World War 2 this might have made a little sense. But now, I cannot imagine the point of this gargantuan footprint. There are about 24 bases in sub-Saharan Africa. It is, frankly, unbelievable. None of these are zones of occupation, in the sense that we rule the country they are in. None of them, outside of perhaps South Korea, are garrisons, in the classic sense of guarding that location from harm, particularly from the natives. Our bases are all established on a cooperative basis, in what appears to be a mania for military relations with other countries, to facilitate training, arms sales, a forward footprint for ourselves, and resupply depots. They constitute a sort of international embassy system of the US military.

This is the real problem that the restraint crowd is getting at. They suggest also that another function of these foreign bases is as tripwires, to show our seriousness about each alliance and drag us into any war that the host country experiences. This may be true of our core NATO and East Asian bases, but most others are of a much less momentous, and more transactional nature. At any rate, this vast archipelago, as well as the ~500 bases within the US, is much more fertile ground for policy change in the military-industrial complex than efforts to dis-empower our foreign policy more broadly.

The crux is whether we would be more effective with a smaller footprint. While each of these foreign bases is desired at some level by its host country, (with some arm-twisting from the US), the audience is probably quite narrow- the local military, the local support staff and suppliers, some of the political class. It is hard to imagine that most people in most countries are happy to have foreign military in their backyards. Thus, looking at the larger picture of US influence abroad, it is pretty easy to make the case that the benefits of most foreign bases are outweighed by their costs, regardless of their direct price tag. This is where more humility and wisdom are needed. Retrenchment needs to be evaluated, not in the frame of why we should be retreating from the world at large and letting other great powers run their neighborhoods more freely. No, it should be evaluated on how it would benefit our soft power position, beneficially shaping the international environment and attracting more friends to our side.

All these considerations are redoubled when an actual war looms. Has our world policing and forward basing been effective? One would have to give it middling marks at best when it comes to military interventions. We saved South Korea from communism/Juche, and Kuwait from Iraq. but we failed in Vietnam, then in Afghanistan, and should not have even started the war on Iraq. Given the hundreds of thousands of lives lost, it is not a great record of using military means for foreign policy ends. The question is whether we have turned to military tools too frequently, when other options were available. The answer is definitely yes, in the cases of both Vietnam and the second Iraq war. It isn't just hindsight, but foresight at the time could have counseled the US to pass on these misbegotten wars. The Iraq war in particular was a failure on every conceivable level- strategic, humanitarian, political, and tactical. There could not be a starker lesson in how not to use military means to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Looking to the future, the Ukraine war suggests that a fair portion of our military power is also technically obsolete. Our military ability to project power rests in large part on last-century technology like aircraft carriers, tanks, and logistics (those bases!). But the new cyber and drone warfare landscape is starkly different, and may require a significant re-vamping of our overall conception of military power. The restraint school naturally fears that the normal course of the military industrial complex would be to add spending for added capabilities, while keeping all our old machinery and programs as well. The budget is not really the big question, however. Rather, do all capabilities of the government (diplomatic, economic, and military) work productively and in concert to maximize our long-term power and security? Given that better diplomacy and smarter options and thinking at the top could save so many lives and forestall such wide-ranging tragedies as the Iraq war, it makes sense to beef up those areas of the government that provide those goods. Maybe something like a formalized adversarial process of policy development, where red teams and blue teams have independent resources, and develop policy plans, historical interpretations, and forward predictions, which are then evaluated after five and ten-year time periods to gauge who is giving better advice. Maybe a history department, to go with our military, intelligence, and diplomatic departments. One can guess from such exercises that we could use less military, and more policy and cultural expertise, on the whole, in a movement that might be termed rebalancing. And this, in the end, is surely the real point of the restraint caucus.

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