China 2: Review of the autobiography of Chang Kuo-t'ao
Before the Chinese Communism was overtaken by Mao, and then the cult of Mao, it was an idealistic glimmer, and stepchild to the world-wide revolution fostered by Soviet Russia. It was founded by students disgusted with the weakness of Qing China and inspired, as were so many others, by the supposedly progressive, modernizing, and anti-imperialistic movement communism was taken to be at this time. Chang Kuo-t'ao (now translated as Zhang Guotao) was generally second-in-command of the Chinese Communist party from its founding through the first united front with the Kuomintang, until differences with Mao forced him out. Ultimately he settled in Canada, and wrote what I have to say is a scintillating memoir of those early days, rich in detail and well-written. He even translated it into English largely himself. He was clearly a formidable intellect, having risen to prominence originally as one of the main student leaders of the May 4th movement. It is astonishing, really, that this book is out of print.
He takes it as given that the progressive causes we all hold dear- labor rights, national sovereignty for countries such as China (against colonial powers and interlopers like Japan and Britain), economic fairness, and democracy (in a manner of speaking) would be served by communism. He strives through these pages to take leadership of labor unions and labor associations, and thereby build the political capital that will lead to the worker revolution. To bind together all the oppressed workers of China- the railway workers, factory workers, the foundry workers, into the Marx-prescribed conscious worker class that takes over the state and bring the next dispensation.
But early on, he travels to Russia right after its civil war, to attend a "Toilers of the East" conference of the Comintern, (surely an inspiration for Newspeak), and it is a decidedly jarring experience. The conditions are unbelievably primitive, the people are suffering, and the hand of the state is not so benevolent. Later, during the days of the NEP, conditions improve, and Chang can look on Russia with a bit more admiration. But here, now, it is a mess. He also meets Lenin during this trip, remarking immediately on his intelligence and approachability, in contrast to most of the others he is seeing. Unfortunately, the Comintern officials sent by Russia to baby-sit the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are a series of abrasive or scheming characters, often out more for the interests of Russia than those of China or even the CCP. But since the Comintern was providing much of their funding, it got to have a lot of say as well.
Mao Zedong also attended the inaugural conference of the CCP, but Chang characterizes him as a country bumpkin, and this first volume of his memoir hardly mentions Mao further at all. That comes in volume 2, which this review does not cover. The major issues of the time were- how to grow the organization in the teeth of almost universal opposition by the conservative and economic elites, leading frequently to police attacks and imprisonment? This warlord epoch had a silver lining, however in its diversity- the rulers in Beijing tended to be more conservative, but those in Shanghai and Guandong were more sympathetic and lenient. The second issue was whether and how to align with the Kuomintang- the main nationalist party under Sun Yat Sen, who had been staging revolts against the Qing for decades, and was the first president (however briefly) of the Republic of China.
Chang does not say a great deal about the growth issue, except to say that he led the party's efforts to organize worker's unions and bind them into larger national associations. This led to exponential growth over the middle 1920's, where each successive year's conference would have ten-fold more participants. He has a great deal more to say about relations with the Kuomintang- the so-called united front. From Sun Yat Sen's perspective, the more the merrier. The communists were, while he was alive, a minor, activist, and intellectual element in his coalition. Critically, it was also a politically visionary and progressive element. While the Kuomintang had largely lost its political reason for existence with the fall of the Qing, and was becoming a party of everyone against Japan, the communists had a much more activist and forward-thinking political program. A program that was specifically strong enough to enforce dominance over their military efforts. No communist general ever became a rogue warlord.
On the other hand, for the communists, alliance with the Kuomintang was existential. The Russian advisors constantly urged them to formally become Kuomintang members. To mix in, and eventually become so strong as to take over the whole organization. But Chang was always opposed and reluctant. Serving two masters was no way to keep the purity of the communist faith. And one could easily foresee that the stronger the communists became, the more friction would enter into the relationship, and the more resistance would come from conservative elements of the Kuomintang, of which there were many. That is certainly how it turned out. The communists were purged twice over- once in the 1927, and again after the two parties allied during World War 2 to drive out the Japanese.
What struck me most about this whole story was the importance of a strong political program. The warlord periods and actors in Chinese history are characterized by elite competition in the baldest terms. Warlord A is based in one region and has a local base of the armies and elites of his region. warlord B has the same elsewhere. Whoever is the cannier general, or more scheming maneuverer among various corruptible officials and generals, wins the prize and claims the mandate of heaven. But suppose that one of these generals has a truly popular political program of systematically freeing the peasants of their age-old chains. That would be an entirely different proposition, and brings a whole new level of political power to bear, both internally and externally.
Comparison with the Americal Revolution is instructive. The Americans had a relatively coherent political program- freedom from the English yoke, and a dedication to doing self-goverment even better than the English, with enlightened institutions and enunciated, limited, powers. The political dominance over their military instruments was absolute. George Washington spent the whole war complaining and wheedling the Continental Congress for more of everything, but he never entertained the thought of taking over the revolution, like a prefigured Napoleon or Chiang Kai-shek.
Conversely, the example of "our side" in Vietnam. The Southern government offered a political program of corruption, landlord-ism, anti-Buddhism, and alliance with the imperialist foreigners. That was not a winning formula!
So far, so good. But what was the nature of the communist political program? This was in the end, another imperialist import from the West, a particularly poisoned chalice. Chang writes frequently of organizing and taking control of other organizations such as unions and union federations, as though it was the most natural thing in the world. Democracy is confined, at best, to the communist central committee, which votes on various important topics. But cultivation of true democracy, mild governance, and respect for the base of their party? There isn't much of that at all. Far more attention is devoted to the propaganda department, as the modern way to generate political support. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" is never defined, never expanded into model of governance, but left as a slogan, to be wielded by the most ruthless among the communist leadership to mean alot of dictatorship and not much proletariat.
Chang describes his own regrets as follows:
"And I, so enthusiastic then about the Communist ideal and one of the founders of the movement, who for eighteen years was to labor as a coolie in its service under terrible difficulties, could never have believed that I would have no choice but to leave this CCP after it had been poisoned by Stalin and Mao Tse-tung.
How could there have been such fantastic developments? Readers will find the answer in the narrative that follows. Generally speaking, when a small number of people launch an armed insurrection, a revolution of force that leads to the establishment of this or that brand of revolutionary state power and practices dictatorial rule, they must eventually abandon their idealistic principles and righteous beliefs of their early period and replace them with concepts of power, treachery and plotting, terror and cruelty, etc. The Communist movement is inseparably linked with the proletarian dictatorship; and so the Communist system of dictatorship must produce such despots as Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. Saying that they poisoned the CCP is tantamount to saying that the ugly realities of dictatorship have buried the beautiful future perspective of communism. The major inherent lesson is that the CCP has suffered from the incurable disease of dictatorship."
Both the Soviet Union and China, as communist dictatorships, also ended up wielding an imperialist sword over their near-abroad, imposing immense suffering on subject peoples and ethnic groups. A deep irony for movements that were fundamentally anti-imperialist in their origins and rhetoric. Chang was clearly caught up in the intellectual currents and enthusiasms of his day, which to us seem almost inexplicable, and do not compare well with better eras of the enlightenment.
