Hardly any academic field is subject to such divergent opinions as philosophy. While most people ignore philosophy and especially what philosophers say, with complete indifference, if not mockery, philosophers see themselves as grappling with the most enormous questions that lie at the very heart of our society and humanity. They are the ones asking the deepest questions of what is good, what is true, what is meaning, and what is being. Why, oh why are they marooned in ivory towers writing tedious monographs that no one reads or cares about? Specialization is particularly pernicious in this field, transforming what might be a pleasant conversational raconteur and dorm room bullshitter into an academic mired in most arcane and pointless hairsplitting, in emulation of fields of actual research, employed solely because university students must, after all, have philosophy courses.
Still, hope springs eternal that the mental firepower so evident in the written work of these fields could come down off the mountain and briefly enlighten the masses about what is true. Such is the project of Simon Blackburn, eminent atheist philosopher retired from Cambridge and other institutions. His book is modeled on that great work of Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit. Bullshit happens when the speaker doesn't care about truth at all, whether for it (truth) , or against it (lying). Our current president puts out a lot of bullshit, but mostly he is a pathological liar with a genius for coming up with the most mendacious and divisive lie in any situation. That is why speaking with Muller was deemed by everyone around him to be a "perjury trap". Going further, the new politics we inhabit seems to have left rational discourse behind. The right decries political correctness, which cruelly enforces reason and decency. The solution is to create an emotional discourse full of tribal identifiers but otherwise senseless, making of our politics a simple blue/green contest, ending up, ironically enough, in identity politics.
Blackburn also takes some political shots, which, since he is British, aim mostly at the egregious lying prevalent in the pro-Brexit campaign. But the book is largely a survey / critique of philosophical attitudes towards truth. The starting point, naturally, is the correspondence theory of truth. While called a theory, is it more a definition- that truth consists of mental models that correspond with reality. Heliocentrism is more true than geocentrism, Thucidides is more true than Herodotus, NPR news is more true than FOX news. Blackburn takes those outré philosophers (postmodernists particularly) to task for disputing such basic conceptions.
"At the end of the twentieth century the intellectual fashion known as postmodernism took an ironical stance towards science, regarding it in an anthropological spirit as simply the ideology of a particular tribe of self-selecting people calling themselves physicists, chemists, engineers, and biologists. The standpoint seemed to many to be a sophisticated response to science's claims to authority. It was tough-minded and knowing, and its proponents could flatter themselves as having seen through and exploded spurious claims to authority, as relativists and skeptics typically do. It was all very exciting- until one saw the same sophisticates using iPhones and GPS devices, relying detergents and paints and aeroplanes, vaccinating their children, and doing all the other things that the progress of science has enabled us to do. And then its glamour disappears, and instead it looks more than a little bonkers."
But there have been other, less dismissive approaches to defining truth- the coherence theory and pragmatism. Both take a step back from the correspondence definition, in light of our practical difficulties in knowing when we have gotten to that glorious state of correspondence. Coherence substitutes an agreement among authorities, such as a convergence among physicists of the late 1800's that everything of importance had already been found, and it was only left to work out the details. Global warming supplies another example- if 99% of relevant experts assign it to human causes, then perhaps it is, for all practical purposes, true. Pragmatism takes a similarly indirect approach relying on practical effects for validation of a truth. If planes fly, then much of the aeronautical theory underlying them is likely, again, to be true. I think it is useful to class coherence and pragamatism as methods of ascertaining or approximating truth, not as definitions. The point of truth remains getting us in sync with reality. If we were gods, then no pragmatism or coherence among authorities of lines of evidence would be needed- we would just know what the truth is, but it would still be a matter of correspondence between reality and our sovereign mind.
From there, things really start going downhill. Blackburn makes a diversion into deflationism, which claims that the correspondence theory is not so much a theory as a tautology, therefore meaningless. The problem here is a reliance on absurd linguistics. The word truth is generally not needed in truth claims, like "grass is green", as opposed to "the thought that grass is green corresponds with the facts", or "it is true that grass is green". It should be obvious that in the first phrase, the word "is" does a lot of work, setting out the truth claim quite clearly. It is hardly meaningless, or not a truth claim, thus it is little surprise that adding extra "truthy" qualifiers hardly add anything.
From there, the discussion descends into aesthetics, morality, and religion. Blackburn seems to have a hard time making sense of these fields, virtually giving up critique, and laying out lots of philosophical history and attitudes, which end up putting quite a bit of value on truth talk in these fields. For example, if we all agree that killing babies is bad, then it is true that killing babies is bad. Or, if ice cream is good, then it is true as well. There is a lengthy discussion of the formation of tastes, such that experts with deep knowledge of some art form can educate others to have more refined tastes, which all seems to form an argument for the truth of the tastes and the authority of the experts.
"But if we have been careful and imaginative and profited from the best opinion of others in the common pursuit, we can be reasonably confident that we have done justice to the topic [of some case of artistic evaluation]. We can advance our opinions, which also means we can judge them, perhaps provisionally and in cognisance of our own fallibility, as true."
But here I have to differ fundamentally. Philosophy deals with what is true and what is good. These are not the same things. Just because everyone agrees on something being good ... does not make it true. The criterion is radically different, being our judgement of goodness for human existence, whether for us personally, or for larger social structures such as our family, country or global society. Even if that judgement is putatively objective, such as population growth in response to "good" policies or virtues, the value of that criterion remains subjective, as it is we who value population growth and flourishing, not perhaps the other animals who may die as a result. So one might claim it to be true that something is good, given expert justification or widespread agreement, but calling things true because they are good, or very good, in some aesthetic, moral, or other subjective sense, is bad philosophy as well as bad language. Whether Blackburn really intends this claim is unclear due to the murky nature of the discussion, unfortunately. At any rate, it is the age-old gambit of religions, to cast what they wish and like as truth. For philosophy to confusedly retain this atavism in its approach to morality and other goods would be deeply mistaken.
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