Fin de siècle France was a mess. After a century of social and political enervation, France was not the powerful country she was over most of Western history. Proust is a fair barometer, obsessed by the distant glories of the noble houses, but met in the present with their dissipated exemplar, Baron de Charlus. World War 1 was billed by some as a romantic rite of purification by blood, but turned out to be throughly ruinous and horrible, leaving the France even more adrift and traumatized, despite having "won".
Naturally, France then failed to face up to the rapidly developing threat from the East, and crumpled igominiously once the Germans came, entering into the quasi-occupation / collaboration that was Vichy. Who was appalled by this? Everyone, even the Germans. And especially Charles de Gaulle, a government minister and military figure who had argued over the prior decade for military mechanization and mobilization, to supplement the static Maginot line. He was incensed that the government chose to surrender and enter into collaboration, instead of spiriting off what and who they could to France's extensive overseas possessions and continuing the war from there (while leaving the French continental population to whatever administration the Germans saw fit to impose).
Seeing no one else stepping up to that task, he took it on himself, powered by the radio broadcasting resources of the BBC. He stands as one of the great statesmen of the century, single-handedly organizing the Free French resistance against what turned out to be the millenarian and cataclysmic Hitlerian regime, leading the French state during the very delicate and difficult post-war period, and also re-organizing the French state (the Fifth Republic) along new lines, within which it still exists today.
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| At the liberation. |
Vain? Yes. Monomanical? Absolutely. A selective memoirist? Yes. A born politician? Evidently. De Gaulle was obsessed with the greatness of France, a phrase that comes up time and again in his memoir. He most potent weapon was the word "No". When Britain wanted to get some payback for all its assiduous help, by, say, acquiring some of the French possessions in the Middle East like Lebanon and Syria, De Gaulle said no, and fought them off. De Gaulle faught tooth and nail for every colonial backwater, and later on for every inch of German territory he could wrest out of the Allies. This "No" rose out of the power De Gaulle developed as head of the French people, nurturing their feelings of pride, and victimization, and hope, through the long years of occupation, and the slow process of liberation.
The most interesting aspect of the book is the careful (if self-adulatory) accounting De Gaulle constantly keeps of how his listeners are feeling- how the spiritual bond between him and troops being reviewed, or crowds hearing his speaches, or the French community at large, is developing. It is feelings which are the object of propaganda, the sinews of civic community, and the foundation of national power. These feelings start off rather tenatively, but via the radio broadcasts, and through slow persistence on the ground, first setting up shop in England, then Brazzaville (then part of the French empire, wrested from Vichy), then Algiers, and finally Paris, De Gaulle gains the hearts of the French, and enters into uncontested administration of post-war France. De Gaulle also carefully took charge of the internal French resistance, by supplying arms, other logistics, and leadership.
A sample quote: De Gaulle, installed back in Paris, receives a communication from Marshal Pétain, earlier the titular head of the Vichy regime, now on his way to imprisonment in Germany, to the effect that Petain would like to negotiate with De Gaulle about the transfer of formal powers of administration in France, i.e. his own surrender, in order to prevent civil unrest.
"But what reply could I make to this communication? In such matters, sentiment could not stand in the face of the rights of the state. The Marshal referred to civil war. If by that he meant the violent confrontation of two factions of the French people, the hypothesis was quite out of the question. For among those who had been his partisans, no one, now, rose up against my power. There was not, on liberated soil, one department, one city, one commune, one official, one soldier, not even one individual who professed to oppose De Gaulle our of loyalty to Pétain. As for reprisals, if certain factions of the resistance might commit retaliatory actions against the people who had persecuted them in collaboration with the enemy, it devolved upon the public authority to oppose itself to such actions, while insuring the action of justice. In this matter, no compromise was conceivable."
It is an object lesson for our time, in making a nation great again. Firstly, De Gaulle writes very well, in style that is admired in France, and also communicates his clarity of intellect, even in translation. Secondly, he generates increasingly representative advisory councils as he goes along, always taking the temperature of the major threads of French resistance (including the communists whom he loathes). Instead of tearing down state structures, he continually builds up new ones, in preparation for effective administration of ever larger populations and areas. Thirdly, he is never a poodle for foreign powers, standing up for French interests at every point, even when there is no France to stand up for. And fourth, his mind is always on the big picture. There are no scandals in this book, only high policy and monomaniacal focus on the objectives of a healthy France, Europe, and world.
He sees that in order to conduct the resistance from colonial territories, he will have to promise their independence, at least in principle. But getting from there presents enormous problems, especially when the British push Arab and Islamist agitation. De Gaulle ended up being the one to wind up the bitter Algerian war, (1962), selling out the various pied noir (settlers, in current parlance) to grant Algerian independence. When the US dreamt up the United Nations, De Gaulle viewed it with suspicion (and, in view of the ill-fated League of Nations, with some distain), even as he successfully got a seat on the security council. While this council may seem an absurd anachronism today, its original aim was rather evidently to serve as an anti-German league, consisting of all the Allied powers from WW2, particularly those surrounding Germany.
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| De Gaulle with Willy Brandt. De Gaulle was intent on building good relations with Germany, and integrating Germany into a new pan-European economic and security system. |
In addition to his bitterness about Britain's greed, De Gaulle was bitter about the US as well. Roosevelt never took him seriously, and continually tried to circumvent De Gaulle in setting up occupation administrations and in conferring with the "big" allies. It is not entirely clear what the basis of this distaste was. It was putatively about De Gaulle's upstart status, as one who created his own state out of nothing, rather than sitting atop a pre-existing apparatus, not to mention a lack of democratic credentials. It was also about France's weakness- her ignominious military defeat left a sour taste, for sure. There was also France's unproductive treatment of Germany after WW1, first demanding huge reparations that prostrated and embittered Germany, then lacking the backbone to back them up or productively renegotiate them, rather allowing Hitler to thumb his nose at the Versailles regime and embark on his mad buildup to WW2. Or there may have been something else. But De Gaulle got his revenge later on, when he entangled the US in Vietnam, which was one jewel he was exceedingly reluctant to yield out of the colonial empire, especially to a bunch communists. All in all, our relations with France are a lesson on focusing on the current war and the friends you have, not the last one, or the ones you wish you had.
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