Cultural Trauma and Authoritarianism

What the Mongols did to the Muslim world, China, and Russia.

Russia is certainly in the news now, and what do you know, but over the holidays Santa Claus brought me Martin Sixsmith's history of Russia. It breezes all too quickly through the first millenium or so of Rus, from its semi-mythical origins in the 800's as yet another Viking outpost, like that of the Jutes, Angles, and Saxons in England, and the Normans in France, England and later in Italy and Palestine.

Sixsmith paints a picture of a reasonably cosmopolitan and open society (centered in Kiev) in the very early period, though always quarreling and lacking centralized leadership and legitimacy, as was true for most other Western regions during the middle ages (and elsewhere in human history). All that changed in 1240, when the Mongols concluded a lengthy conquest, and put Russia under a severe yoke for the following 240 years.

While there has been quite an effort in recent years to rehabilitate the Mongols, one can make the case that the rise of Western Europe over all other areas of the world in the last few hundred years is due in large part to the destruction or hobbling of its competitors by the Mongols. This applies to China, to Russia, and most profoundly, to the Muslim world.

In Russia, the Mongols exterminated entire cities and forced the remainder to pay heavy tributes, as well as a lot of bowing and scraping, to their new overlords. But contrary to Sixsmith's portrayal, the Mongol rule was not terribly heavy-handed. They ruled through the local nobility, which, while neutered, was not destroyed. The Mongols also instituted some administrative efficiencies that accelerated institutional development. Perhaps the main effect, however, was the general trauma of violation and subjugation. With no natural borders, and predatory neighbors, the Russians evidently came to the conclusion that: 1. With regard to governing style, if you can't beat them, join them (i.e. the autocratic, despotic, and extremely effective military organization of the Mongols), and 2. That autocratic central power is the only way to keep Russia whole against its many neighbors. We in the US live in such a pleasant and peaceful neighborhood (Oh, Canada!), yet still are strikingly paranoid about Communism, Islam, immigration, etc.- take your pick. Imagine if those threats were actually real!

The enormous Mongol empire, 1200's.

Sixsmith certainly draws a line between this trauma and the continuing dedication of Russia to statism and autocracy, now exemplified by Vladimir Putin's nouveau despotism. China has ended up in a very similar place, from a much longer history of dynamic centralization, but similar subjugation by the Mongols. It is easy to draw the lesson that strength is the only way to survive in such a rough neighborhood. Yet it is a conclusion a little too-easily drawn by those already in power, whose only real interest is staying in power. Both China and Russia are exemplars of the extremes of depotic rule, particularly after it was given a whole new propagandistic lease on life by a Western ideology far more amenable and convenient than liberal democracy: communism. In China, it works tolerably well at the moment, but only by being radically tamed from the heights achieved by Chairman Mao.

But the saddest trauma was suffered by the Muslim world, which was at its height when the Mongols trashed Baghdad. In the centuries since, they have not gained a continent-wide empire (excepting the conquests and splendors of Mughal period), and have fallen progressively behind Western Europe. Whether the low point was the cavalier carving up of Muslim countries by the British (and French and Russians) after the fall of the Ottoman empire, or the current Islamist insanity, the Muslim world has had an increasingly frought relationship with the rest of the world, and with Modernity.

The Muslim approach to statehood and governance has always been lacking, based as it is on Muhammed as a singular and unreplicable example. A tribal and militaristic style succeeded after Muhammed's death, in channelling the energies of the unified community to winning an enormous empire. The caliphate then kept things together loosely, with religion as the core of identity. But it was always by civil war that God decided on the winners in the battle for the next ruling family. In Europe, the Catholic church (and its monastic affiliates) provided a much more stable model of governance, via election out of an oligarchy of cardinals. Later on, the Protestant reformation prompted ever greater attention to the role of the individual, as arbiter of celestial as well as terrestrial salvation. These threads of practice and theory led, in excruciatingly slow fashion, to the secular democratic state we have today.

When crisis threw Muslims back onto their religion as the bulwark of communal identity, there was little to go on to develop state institutions. Thus states tended to revert to tribal autocracy as the model. In the Arab core of the Muslim world, this remains the rule to this day. In outlying areas, however, such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey, (possibly Egypt and Tunisia), non-religious ideologies and influences have been more powerful, such as British colonialism, and the active Westernizing secularism of Ataturk. These countries have highly authoritarian tendencies, but have so far successfully cast aside enough of their Muslim ideological baggage to make democratic systems work to some degree.

This lack of legitimate state development in the bulk of the historical Muslim world, perhaps accentuated by the trauma of Mongol destruction, is central to its current complaints. It was central to their lack of resistance to Western imperialism, to their lack of effective post-colonial governance, to lack of human development and the economic development it leads to. It was also central to our disasters in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US dreamed of quickly implanting democracy, only to be faced by a culture utterly unprepared for it, with far more fissiparous fish to fry. If God anoints the strong to rule over the weak, by way of warfare in general and jihad in particular, what is the point of legally bound representative state institutions?

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Extremism is no Accident

Gun owners and Muslims have something in common.

One of the watershed events leading up to the American Civil War was the caning of Senator Charles Sumner by Senator Preston Brooks of South Carolina, in 1856. Sumner was an outright abolitionist from Massachusetts, and had just given a landmark speech on the fate of Kansas, upon which the future direction of the nation hinged. Sumner let it all hang out, portraying Kansas as a virgin raped by the slave powers which were working to corrupt its institutions and force it to come into the union as a slave state. Hours long and shooting insults in all directions, it was quite extreme for its time. Two days later Brooks attacked Sumner in the Senate chamber with a metal-topped cane and beat Sumner, who was trapped at his desk, about the head to within an inch of his life. Brooks was assisted by a colleague, congressman Henry Edmundson from Virginia, who held off Sumner's supporters with a pistol.

No event illustrated quite so markedly the depths to which the sectional divide had sunk, or the clash of cultures between the industrializing, striving North, and the feudal South. The action was extremist, but clearly arose from the respective tribal affiliations and ideologies at work. Southerners apparently welcomed it as honor vindicated, while to the North, it exemplified the barbarity inherent in the slave system, not only embodied in the abject subjugation of slaves, but in the moral coursening of their masters.

Turning to today's ideological battles and extremist events, the rote responses by the various communities implicated in the Orlando shootings bring up the issue of collective responsibility. Does being Muslim implicate you and your beliefs in such an event? Does being a member of the NRA with its opposition to controlling military-grade weapons? If a group's ideology is exemplified by such an event, what is the degree of individual responsibility and culpability?

One can turn to the German question as another, closer, historical example. Germans today still bear a stigma and responsibility deriving from the disastrous world wars of the last century. That is as it should be. Germany and Germans are not pacifist, but they have taken on an extra measure of responsibility for restitution viz-a-vis Jews and Israel, and for peace in Europe. Their economic policies may be tending in the opposite direction, but on the whole, they have meant well over the post-war decades, forging a close relationship with France and various structures of European cooperation.

People are part of groups for a reason, and bear both the costs and benefits of their groups. Homosexuals may be so stigmatized by their membership (which is, unlike some other groups under discussion, not a voluntary membership) that they deny that membership and stay in the closet. Southerners dedicated to the perpetuation of slavery were rarely extremist, but derived benefits from extremist acts. The brutality at the margins, vs escaped slaves, exhibitions of black pride, and unsympathetic whites, kept the system intact, for the benefit all those who didn't want to get their hands dirty.

Membership in Islam is less directly culpable, given the large size of the group compared to the proportionately small numbers of extremists. For example, polls that show that a majority of Muslims do not support ISIS, yet the remainder amounts to “roughly 50 million people [who] express sympathy”. Which is quite a large pool of people to draw on, and more importantly a significant problem for the community of Islam as a whole, not to mention the rest of us. The scriptures of Islam are a well from which countless fundamentalists have learned to hate, and to see violence as both beneficial and sacred. While some forms of Islam, notably Sufi-ism, have renounced these aspects of their tradition in wholesale fashion, the dominant forms of Islam today have not. The strain coming from Saudi Arabia is particularly filled with negativity- towards women, towards apostates, towards Shia, towards infidels.

Extremists are not opposed to their group. As a rule, they believe that most members are insufficiently dedicated to the group’s overall goals and ideology. Fundamentalism, be it gun nuttery or Islamism, is usually couched in original scriptures, and a dismissal of the wishy-washy-ness of the mass of members who value civility and moderation over principle. The ideology of the group leads directly to the occurrence of extremists, if only in a minority of cases. It is the ideology that is at fault if, taken seriously, it leads what the rest of us characterize as extremism. And historically, extremism in Islam has been highly successful, providing the military motivation and success that makes so many people Muslim today. Moderates benefit from extremism.

In ideological terms, ideologies such as religions tout themselves as truth in both moral and scientific senses. The latter is naturally absurd, while the former is just as wrong, since morality is never a closed book. However, given the truths that the Koran provides, it is only natural to hate infidels, apostates, and love God, his messenger, and the jihad that will convert the world. Only an attitude of skepticism about these truths would prompt someone to take a more moderate stance, such as accepting the legitimacy of non-Muslim narratives and approaches to life. Why would a community want to foster such skepticism? That would be counter-productive. Thus extremists are countenanced as their over-enthusiastic brethren, as maybe a political problem with regard to the outside world, but far from an ideological or theoretical problem. This makes communities unable to successfully reprove their extremists, be they anti-abortion zealots, islamic terrorists, or gun-rightists.

This is why we need to pay attention to the tenor of the entire community from which extremists spring. It is not Islamophobia to see a fundamental ideological problem within Islam which fosters bigotry, regressive institutions, and violence so pervasively in the Middle East. Turning back to our Civil War, the extremist violence that occurred in the Senate in 1856 was not an isolated incident, but part of a pattern of discontent and insurrection that had been building in the South, especially South Carolina, for decades. Slavery was at the core of a culture that had diverged to a startling degree from that in the North, and elsewhere in the Western world- a relic of feudalism or worse. Its desperation to persist in a fundamentally immoral institution, and spread it to other sections of the frontier, was inimical to modernity and to decency. The ideologies of the North and the South were incompatible, and the sparks of extremist acts such as the caning of Sumner, and the raid on Harper’s Ferry, were harbingers of the cataclysm to come, as well as cultural and ideological divides we still struggle with today.

Postscript: As for gun ideology, it is not as directly militant as fundamentalist Islam. In fact, it entertains a sort of apple pie fantasy, where all gun owners are rock-ribbed patriots standing with their exquisite training and dedication to the CONSTITUTION athwart the forces of chaos and tyranny. The problem here is not (mostly) what the ideology includes, but what it leaves out- which is reality.  Every empirical study shows that the more guns there are, the more deaths, for a variety of causes like suicide, domestic violence, and accidents, not to mention mass murders, where in every recent case the guns were recently purchased for the purpose. Guns are extremely dangerous, and not everyone who has them makes a fetish of personal firearms training and lock-down security.  Clutching their pearls when some extremist uses a legally purchased semi-automatic to mow down innocent people is a clearly insufficient response to the problem by the gun community. A fantasy of responsibility can not hide a reality of frequent irresponsibility and utterly unnecessary danger.

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A Son of Hamas Turns His Back

Review of the documentary, the Green Prince. Spoiler alert.

In one of the more bizarre twists of the Palestinian drama, the son of a Hamas leader turned into a tireless worker for the Shin Bet from about 1997 to  2007. Now he lives in the US, at undisclosed locations. This film is essentially an memoir of this story, with two people talking to the camera, Mosab Hassan Yousef, the son, and Gonen Ben Yitzhak, his Israeli intellegence handler.

The format was oddly compelling, because the people are compelling- intelligent and dedicated. But to what? Yousef was raised in the West Bank, the eldest son in a leading family, and became his father's right hand. His father was one of the main people you would hear screaming on the news, preaching publicly about the evils of Israel, the righteousness of Islam and the Intifada, and the need for Hamas to run things in the West Bank as well as Gaza. As Hamas goes, he was not the most extreme, but nor was he a member of the Palestinian Authority- the Palestinian patsies.

Father HassanYousef at a Hamas Rally.

So turning to the Shin Bet was unthinkable in tribal terms. But when Yousef had his first experience in prison, courtesy of an Israeli checkpoint where he was found with some guns, he had a chance to compare tribes. While the Israelis were harsh, they had limits and operated under some kind of lawful system.

The Hamas cell in the prison, however, was brutally sadistic. Yousef describes the killing of scores of putative spies and informants in horrific fashion, with scant evidence. For an idealistic youth, it presented a problem, especially in contrast to the idealized version of the Palestinian cause that he had grown up with. Where at first he didn't take the offer from the Shin Bet seriously, now he had second thoughts. What if his idealism was more about non-violence, peace, and saving lives than about tribal competition?

There follows a lengthy career relaying information from his position at the center of Hamas with his father to the core of Shin Bet, preventing attacks, preventing assassinations, and also, in essence, dictating his father's fate. A central conundrum of intelligence work like this is how to use the informant's information without giving away his or her identity. To maintain Yousef's cover for a decade bespeaks very careful work on all sides.

But the larger issue remains untouched. While Yousef comes off as heroic and idealistic, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is no more justified by Israel's lawful and partial restraint (or by its relentless stealing of land) than it is by the bottomless resentment and madness of Hamas. Treat people like prisoners and animals, and they often act that way. Moreover, Israel holds total control. They need no "partners" to resolve their doomed and immoral occupation. They only need to get out, and get their settlers out.

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Euhemerization

People making gods, as usual- and the mythical nature of Jesus.

All aspects of the existence and nature of Jesus are a matter of theory, not fact. So much of the early literature about him is forged, made-up, laced by myth and parable, and templated by religious traditions, philosophical preconceptions and political exigencies, that the nature of (or existence of) the actual, historical Jesus is a matter of speculation and inference at best.

Bart Ehrman wrote an exasperated book about the evidence for the historical Jesus, affirming, despite his own lack of conventional faith, and through his dedicated scholarship in the field, that the consensus position of Christians and scholars is correct. The problem of the thin-ness of the evidence remains, however, since all the evidence comes from internal (Christian) and late (not contemporaneous) sources. This is not unusual or unexpected for any Roman of this time, other than the very highest levels of emperors and writers, but hardly allows a solid case either pro or con. A great deal turns, for instance, on one's interpretation of the word "brother", since Paul, in letters that are widely agreed to be reasonably authentic, refers to James as a brother of Jesus. If this means a biological brother, it means that Jesus, by this chain of evidence, really existed biologically. Whether his mother was a perpetual virgin is another matter, of course! Or was James a spiritual brother, as is the common usage has been for many religious communities? Ehrman, as an expert, comes down clearly on the biological side.

Myth, or just mythic?

Both cases, for and against the historicity of Jesus, are thus circumstantial, based on the credibility of scraps of evidence, or the credibility of a counter-story elaborated by the mythicists, where Jesus begins as a deity who is brought down to earth (euhemerized) for a variety of motives that are quite understandable, and precedented by similar gods and god-men before and since. Casting one's god as a real person makes the provenance and stability of his teachings more secure than that of a deity that communicates through revelation, and could do so again at any time. And stories are easy to make up and write down. A recent talk by Richard Carrier makes this case with gusto.

I am not going rehash the arguments here. But only say that the pro-historical case, while certainly traditional, popular, and even likely, is, even by Bart Ehrman's telling, hung on very thin threads of internal evidence, on texts whose transmission to us is an endless story of copying, re-copying, correction, obfuscation, politics, and forgery. The early Christian times are a fascinating period of political and archetypal turmoil. No path is straight, least of all the texts that purport to tell the story. Take for instance, the case of Marcion, who supposedly collected letters of Paul and devised the first Christian cannon. Marcion is thought to have written a good bit of it himself, and founded a theology that was very popular in its day, only to ripen into heresy later on at the hands of what comes down to us as orthodoxy.

The project of making Christianity's hodge-podge of scriptures fit the orthodox story as it evolved through the centuries is mind-bogglingly complicated and obviously ongoing, given the many versions of the Bible and of Christianity that are still running around. The process is reminiscent of the paradox of Islam, where those who take its origins and scripture most seriously are the most righteous and violent, whereas those who merge into more mature traditions, as they ripened through time into human, and typically humane, institutions, are much more resistant to the fundamentalist call.

Getting back to the foundations, what is the precedent for euhemerization such as what happened to the person or entity we call Jesus? And for its complement, apotheosis? These days, the traffic between heaven and earth has hit some kind of traffic jam. But in antiquity, it was far more common for people such as kings and emperors to become gods, and also for gods to come down to earth, in tales such as the Homeric epics. Divinity was assumed to exist, and divine beings were pretty much formed in the image of ourselves, at our most powerful. Both the Jewish god(s) and the Greek gods were distinguished by their power much more than their knowledge, let alone their emotional wisdom or kindness.

Even farther back, the template is of course the family, and the trauma of death. The death of any person, let alone a powerful, archetypal person like a parent, is unimaginable. How can life stop cold, how can existence simply end? Impossible. We have thus come up with a rich set of rationalizations and theologies of additional existence. They typically involve the movement of people (souls) from this world to some other invisible world, where they look back with fondness to what is still the important place, our world.

But then comes the important question of whether and how this spritual world, if it is to have any ongoing function for us, interacts with ours. Our souls clearly have some modus operandi by which they co-function with our living bodies, mortal though they are. Likewise, spirits and gods must have some way back into the world if we wish to involve them in our dramas. Thus we end up with a rich literature of heroic journeys to heaven (or the underworld) and back, gods taking up disguises as women or men (or animals), throwing thunderbolts, causing natural cataclysms, etc.

It is only the higher psychological and philosophical sophistication of our age that has slowed down this traffic, though it peeks out of our unconscious in the endless array of super-hero movies, not to mention a majority of the country that still holds fast to some version of the traditional theological stories.

Let us close with a couple of quotes from Thomas Paine speaking of the Christian believer, vs a true deist, from his deist book, "The Age of Reason":

"Yet, with all this strange appearance of humility, and this contempt for human reason, he ventures into the boldest presumptions. He finds fault with everything. His selfishness is never satisfied; his ingratitude is never at an end. He takes on himself to direct the Almighty what to do, even in the govemment of the universe. He prays dictatorially. When it is sunshine, he prays for rain, and when it is rain, he prays for sunshine. He follows the same idea in everything that he prays for; for what is the amount of all his prayers, but an attempt to make the Almighty change his mind, and act otherwise than he does? It is as if he were to say -- thou knowest not so well as I."

"The Bible of the creation is inexhaustible in texts. Every part of science, whether connected with the geometry of the universe, with the systems of animal and vegetable life, or with the properties of inanimate matter, is a text as well for devotion as for philosophy -- for gratitude, as for human improvement. It will perhaps be said, that if such a revolution in the system of religion takes place, every preacher ought to be a philosopher. Most certainly, and every house of devotion a school of science."

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The Women of Deseret

What about feminism? A collision with the modern world. 

Continuing from last week, a particularly interesting topic in the field of Mormonism is the role of women. The church calls itself a "restored" Christianity, which is a fundamentalist position, in that it claims to attempt to reproduce the conditions of the early church, and proselytizes on that basis. This includes naming apostles, extending priesthood to all men, and thorough-going patriarchy. It even meant, during its formative period in the mid to late 1800's, polygamy, based on a bit of cherry-picking from the Old Testament.

Polygamy was also based on a revelation from god to Joseph Smith. One that his (sole) wife at the time, Emma, knew what to do with. She physically burned that revelation, by some accounts. She also agitated against this new doctrine, turning the female relief society into such a dangerous organ that the church leaders shut it down for a couple of decades, after which it was reconstituted and has behaved in properly submissive fashion ever since.

An intriguing aspect of polygamy is the patent lies and dissimulation practised in its defense. The Mormon authors of "The Mormon Expereince" insist that a large part of the rationale (as was the case for Muhammed and Islam) was to provide for otherwise unattached women, the destitute, and to correct for an excess of women due to warfare, etc. But the West in the US always had an excess of men (though see here). More tellingly, polygamy was not a matter of charity, but a reward to the highest officers of the church for their obvious spiritual blessings, to be converted into power and children. The fourth president of the church had six wives and forty-three children. The book also relates that if economically possible, a husband would build separate houses for each of his wives.

This hardly reflects how harmonious the institution was on behalf of women, or how charitable it was towards the destitute. No, it portrays a system of power-mad men, perhaps not wearing huge beards, but otherwise rewarding themselves in a way that suggests that they were somewhat impatient about becoming gods only in the afterlife.

Brigham Young, with what resembles a rather Islamist beard.

It is a problem we also see with the veil on Islamic women. How do we judge and react to oppression when its victims are acquiescent or even explicit supporters of the system and part of a culture which, whatever its flaws, is valued by its members? Can a system of oppression be so insidious as to be invisible? This comes up in the black lives matter movement, not that blacks in the US are acquiescent or supporters of racism, (though studies show that they are also unconsciously color-ist and racist by way of indoctrination), but that non-blacks require continual consciousness raising to a condition that is so ingrained in the social fabric and unconscious that great harms are inadvertantly, and continually done, while rationalizations accrue without end whenever a question or difficulty arises.

There is no objective judgement about social affairs, unfortunately. One group may be treated differently on an objective basis, yet that treatment be justified by any number of value judgements and attitudes whose quality is not objective at all. To take the devil's advocate position for a moment, it is clear that women and men are different, mentally as well physically. Thus it is no surprise that women may typically want different things out of life than men, and might naturally prefer a social system with roles which are different and respectively suited to each gender, both in talent and desire.

To go even deeper, all social organization involves oppression. Every relationship involves expectations and some desire to get something from the other person or change the other person. No one is innocent of manipulation, least of all the infant in its crib. We are social beings, instinctively ready to make commitments of service and sacrifice, working for family, company, nation in return for uncertain, and surely incommensurate, benefits. And ultimately we benefit from the social structures we are enmeshed in, in countless ways. But that is hardly freedom. No one is free.

So the question of civil rights, of equality, and freedom, are ones of degree, not of black and white. The problem of feminism (the problem that has no name!) is one of enumerating the various qualities of people of both genders and asking which ones are relevant to our various (modern) social roles, instead of throwing a lace-trimmed blanket over the whole thing by saying that men are better than women and should run the society from top to bottom, perhaps because they are more violent and warlike.

And even more importantly, it is a project of recognizing and accepting diversity among people, so that even if women and men mostly abide by their stereotypical interests and roles, exceptions are not judged as abnormal, destabilizing, even evil. To take another example, Mormons are no great friends of introverts:

"If our composite family contains members who are temperamentally introverts or 'loners', people preferring quieter life-styles, the church programs may seem uncomfortable- or they may be looked upon as opportunities to emerge from a shell and may help to develop a more balanced personality."

The "life-style" of homosexuality is likewise a source of horror, of course.

In the context of feminism, sure, relatively few women are lesbians, or are interested in joining the infantry, or running for president. But some are, and why not let them? What point do the normative, rather than descriptive, gender roles that conservative, patriarchial institutions like the Mormon church enforce to various degrees, and push with vast amounts of propaganda, serve?

I think there are two main answers. One is the raw power of the patriarchy. As the reader may recall, it took a decade and a half after the civil rights movement for the Mormon church to ask God about the fitness of blacks for the ministry. Here is president Spencer Kimbal writing to the church:

"... we have pleaded long and earnestly on behalf of these, our faithful brethren, spending many hours in the Upper Room of the Temple supplicating the Lord for divine guidance. He has heard our prayers, and by revelation has confirmed that the long-promised day has come when every faithful, worthy man in the Church may receive the holy priesthood, with power to exercise its divine authority, and enjoy with his loved ones every blessing that flows therefrom, including the blessings of the temple."

Note the word "man". Whether they are beseeching god on behalf of women, we have no idea. Personally, I doubt it. The transparent secular motivation of this revelation, as transparent as the federally induced revelation banning polygamy almost a century before, could hardly be more obvious. The patriarchial system likewise, with its old testament tradition, is a institution of power, with clear secular motivations. Why else deny the obvious: that women have as much access to god as men, whatever that might mean?

The second attraction of strict roles is plain orderliness and security. If the family and church is automatically organized by way of gender roles, then that is one less source of conflict and negotiation, or so it might seem to the naive. More psychologically, some standard of "normal" is a powerful organizing principle for us individually and socially. Teenagers want nothing but to be normal, and dread the opposite. People contemplating marriage are more secure in knowing that their partners are thoroughly indoctrinated into their role's "normal" template, minimizing surprise and heartbreak. Mormon institutions up and down the ladder, such as the Women's Relief Society, hum along based heavily on the slotting of all their round pegs into nice, round holes.

One could also bring up from the archetypal depths the common image of the father figure as decider and leader, and the mother figure as nurturer and consoler. Are such images innate, or are they programmed by the patriarchy itself? And even if innate, where else do we so give in to our instincts to pattern all of society on such an archaic basis? The fact of the matter is that women are natural executives, deciding on life and death as effectively, if less violently, as men.

Maturing as individuals out of wild uncultured children involves no end of repression and self-control, to form acceptable adults ready for taking on responsible, interconnected roles in society. What is one more bit of repression, for women to accede to the patriarchial system, in all its social, political, and other dimensions?

Of course, it is simple unfairness, a reflection of ancient feudal and tribal orders where the strong rode herd over the weak. We do not accede to such systems any more in politics and professional life. (With apologies to the GOP, Donald Trump, and our whole campaign finance system.) Why should we do so elsewhere? If the Mormon church really thought so highly of the family and motherhood, it would have opened the priesthood and high offices to women long ago.

The Mormons supposedly believe in the constitution, voting for political (if not ecclesiastical) office, and ironically were leaders in women's suffrage, back in the 1800's. But that constitution is based on the enlightenment principle of equality among all people, and the need for secular, practical, and compelling reasons to deviate from that fundamental assumption. Sure, the constitution in its original incarnation debilitated women, not to mention blacks, but that has since been repaired, again by voting processes, not revelation. The Mormon church, for all its protestations of protecting the family and the sacred roles of each gender, is in this respect an anachronism. Just as much as protecting the family from the homosexual "lifestyle" is an anachronism.

Is it in this respect a "restored" church of Jesus Christ, thus a purposeful anachronism? Obviously, I am no expert. But just because patriarchy was the norm in antiquity, and all the apostles as well as prophets were men does not mean that Jesus (if and however he existed) was not open to the feminine in a spiritual and apostolic sense. There is first of all the adulation and semi-divinity of Mary. Then there is the quasi-apostle-ship of Mary Magdalene. She seems to have had more importance and faith than the rest of the apostles. Indeed, Christianity started off as a religion very accepting of women in powerful positions. In all its cherry-picking, the Mormon church seems to have, in its attachment to hierarchical patriarchy, restored the structure of Catholicism rather than the broad dispensation of Jesus.

• A little feminist outrage.
• What happens when social order breaks down.
• Nihilism may be a problem, but not ISIS's problem.
• Why friends with Saudi Arabia, and not with ISIS?
• Is Iran really the enemy? Or would it be a better friend than the Sunnis?
• Sam Harris on Islam.
• Want to hear more JFK assassination theories?
• Someone is wrong on the internet. Not to say that a recession in the near future is impossible, but raising interest rates would bring it on faster, rather than helping solve it once it arrived. We have to get over expecting monetary authorities to be the only adults in the room.
• Lawrence Lessig on equality.
• Requiem for Douglass North.
• Appreciation for John Locke, and modernity.
• Is renewable energy reaching liftoff?
• On the mechanics of the Fed and its rate liftoff.
• Paul Mason on basic income and the end of work.

The People of Deseret

Mormonism: From a prophet talking through his hat to a quasi-state with lessons for us all. Review of "The Mormon experience" by Leonard J. Arrington and Davis Bitton.

What happens when god speaks to an otherwise unremarkable man, telling him to found a new religion? In the case of Islam, that prophet conjured a mishmash of Christianity and Judaism into a new doctrine that took its world by storm. The stronger subtext, however, was Arab tribalism. It is that tribalism that finds such rich expression in the martial and ceaselessly vitriolic aspects of the Quran, and in the problems we face internationally today.

Meanwhile, in upstate New York, another prophet received his revelation, and after authoring an even more bizarre scripture, (though likewise a pastiche of Old and New testament materials, in part), trod a similiar path of nascent church building, continuing prophecy, practical leadership, occasional skirmishes with enemies, mass migration, and even polygamy. As an aside, the book I am working from was written by Mormons, indeed by an official church historian, so while detailed and highly interesting, is hardly an unbiased account. A chapter on the role of women is particularly tortured in its apologetics.

The parallels are deeply interesting, yet the differences are stark. Mormonism flirted with armed resistance, but very sparingly, and has been a stable and exceedingly peaceful part of the national scene for the last century. Its proselytizing is determinedly, boringly, peaceful. Both religions emphasize charity within their community and separation from gentiles, (termed infidels in the Quran), yet Mormonism has always had a much stronger internal governance structure, even though it has never (to my knowledge) had pretensions of running a fully autonomous state or of providing a comprehensive legal code, as Islam has. Indeed, Mormons regard the US constitution as divinely inspired. Mormonism has been dedicated first and foremost to self-reliance, practical development and social togetherness, for its cultural subtext was American frontier can-do-ism, rather than Arab tribalism.

One might think the differences to be subtle, after watching lots of Westerns. Clans, clan wars, and plenty of six-shooters seem to characterize the epoch. But in reality, Americans were probably more obsessed with orderly self-government and institution building. The annals of early California are full of systems of law passed for transient mining camps, and an eagerness for setting up local and state governments. From the first charters that authorized colonization by the English and Dutch in North America and the long legal traditions and enlightenment that the colonists had left behind, to the newness of the land and the colonist's ideals of freedom in a promised land, Americans were experts in self-government. Indeed the Western is not typically a celebration of lawlessness, but  quite the contrary- is a cautionary tale of its baleful consequences. Every Bonanza show ends with the forces of law and order triumphant.

I digress because, coming out of this tradition, Mormons are compulsive organizers. From the first with Joseph Smith at the helm, they selected or elected apostles and other governing bodies. The succession after Smith's death brought an even more talanted organizer to the helm, Brigham Young, who managed the hegira from their freshly constructed city of Nauvoo, Illinois to what the Mormons called for some time the State of Deseret, now Utah.

The beehive symbolizes Mormonism and Utah.

The original territorial government featured Brigham Young as governor, and other church leaders in all other offices. This seemed completely natural at the time, and few even paid much attention to the formality of elections. When the Federal government attempted to appoint its own officers to oversee the territory, the Mormons simply ran all their affairs unaltered, using a shadow system where church officers held all the power and the obedience of the people. It took far sterner measures from the US government, including moves threatening to destroy the church entirely, before the Mormons acceeded to federal supremacy, normal political forms, and particularly the illegality of polygamy, which finally happened concurrent with the grant of statehood in 1896.

The beehive is a fitting symbol, expecially of the early Mormon experience, which in the early Utah period was one of extreme hardship leavened only by thorough social organization and communal support. Communal larders were set up from the tithes which were all paid in kind, and in turn fed the poor and placated the local Indians. Communal effort was essential to manage the scarce water, for agriculture was only possible by irrigation. When the Union Pacific railroad building project came through, Brigham Young arranged for Mormons to do the work in the territory, to prevent the immigration of undesirable elements. Then he used a large part of the proceeds to build his own railroad within the state. And in a thousand other ways, from the territorial militia to the building of the Salt Lake City temple, orderly government and communal activity was and remains fundamental to Mormonism. (How ironic, however, that beehives have a queen as their president, who has mated with multiple husbands.)

To some, this degree of togetherness can seem rather creepy, and there is a dark side of extreme patriarchy and conformity. Plural marriage, for instance, was not just an odd and occasional peculiarity, but a reward and sign of church leadership, reserved for top officials. It was Old-Testament patriarchy, and natural selection, in action, Mormon style. But there are also positive lessons for our national economic questions, which largely turn today (in the right-left spectrum) on how together we feel, and how high we wish to set the dial of brutal competitiveness and laissez faire, versus a more compassionate egalitarianism. Mormons are typically Republicans due to their social conservatism. Yet their social organization was at the outset virtually communistic, with high social mobility with the possibility of high office (for men), and thoroughly organized social support. This organization was highly effective, not only socially, but economically, taming an extremely forbidding wilderness and creating a strong state out of nothing. Mormons teach us yet again that it takes management and cooperation to run a successful society, not just competition.

Does it also take religion? Mormonism is explicitly Christian, which, hard as it is for an atheist to say, has contributed, on balance, a peace and compassion-oriented ethic or at least counter-weight to other social forces, over the last millennia. (As has Buddhism in its sphere, even more effectively.) Does strong social bonding require something beyond the Lockean contract, of a more spiritual nature? Does the civic religion of baseball, George Washington, and the Bill of Rights suffice to keep everyone in the US working on the common projects of e pluribus unum, or is a more comprehensive narrative required, of humans as embryonic gods, America as the promised land, and our lives in eternity built upon our diligence, faithfulness, and loving kindness in this life?

It is a difficult question when faced with the obvious social efficacy of bizarrely false and seemingly impractical doctrines- not to imagine that such doctrines are true, but to consider whether we as humans can be communally motivated, idealistic, and purpose-driven without them. We differ, some people being allergic to religious drama, and others being unfulfilled without it. Yet societies can not operate without some degree of fervor and common narrative, to clothe the brute competition that forms the base of natural and social existence, and emphasize more idealistic and cooperative ends. What we have on the national scene in the US is a fraying of this narrative, as the wealthy have pulled away, into their gated compounds and isolated social world, even while they control the political system and put anything resembling the public good on the back burner. The sclerosis and atomization are palpable. The Mormon church carried their narrative and communal principle to extremes, sorely testing the constitutional principle of separation of church and state, but also showing the effectiveness of communalism.

Turning back to the comparison with Islam, great communal projects, especially of a charitable nature, are hardly unknown in Islam, particularly during its golden age. But something about the traumatic collision with the West seems to have sapped the ability of the Islam to function as an effective governing philosophy or ideology. The impulse towards fundamentalism is sadly, and ironically, the opposite from what is needed, and is not just the province of a small extreme minority, but represents the leading direction in the world of Islam, from its twin leading sects / countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran. It took centuries for Judaism to adapt to the position of a minority religion during its diaspora, giving up its dreams of temporal (and Temple) power. Perhaps something similiar, (though hopefully less protracted, degrading, and traumatic), possibly coming from Muslim diaspora in Europe, the US or Indonesia, will be needed to burn off the bitter elements and steer Islam in a new direction.

• Yes, ISIS is Islamic. Ultra-Islamic.
• American misadventures in the Muslim world. Why so many bad choices and terrible allies?
• More on comparative religions.
• More somewhat aimless, yet apposite, discussion of "whence Islam".
• Is ISIS fighting a strictly Sunni-Shia civil war, or something a little more ideological and theological? And just how broad is its support?
• Taliban status report.
• Our State Department defends crime and immorality.
• Outstanding TED talk on the minds of animals.
• David Eagleman's wonderful brain.
• Honestly, if we are short of our inflation target, the solution is very simple.
• Is Uber evil, or not so bad?
• Wall Street votes Republican ... why does anyone else?
• Some notes on Adam Smith.
• Splitting hairs on printing money.
• Indeed, dropping the gold standard and fiscal stimulus saved Japan from the depression.
• While European policy has not done so.
• Sanders Snippet of the Week:

"We have a system, which during the 1990s allowed Wall Street to spend $5 billion in lobbying and campaign contributions to get deregulated. Then, ten years later, after the greed, recklessness, and illegal behavior of Wall Street led to their collapse, it is a system which provided trillions in government aid to bail them out. Wall Street used their wealth and power to get Congress to do their bidding for deregulation and then, when their greed caused their collapse, they used their wealth and power to get Congress to bail them out."

Babes in the Woods

Review of the film Restrepo, about US soldiers lost in Afghanistan.

Restrepo is perhaps the foremost cultural document of US involvement in Afghanistan, an documentary of platoon assigned to one of the hottest zones in the war. As film-making, it is very good, mixing post-action interviews and perspective with close footage embedded at the front. Restrepo is the name of an outpost in the Korengal valley of Kunar province some ways west of the Pakistani border, which this platoon founded and held against constant attack by the local population, Taliban, et al. The outpost and valley were later given up to the Taliban after further years of futility. (The film's sequel, named Korengal, is a sentimental pastiche of outtakes from the first effort.)

The men are exemplars of our armed forces; extremely young, immature, good-natured, and given enormous fire-power. They are shattered when a fellow soldier is killed, but kill their enemies with light-hearted glee. Their leader comes across as exemplary as well; disciplined, profane, and effective. Yet something seems sorely missing- knowledge about the social and political setting they have helicoptered into.

Much of the film is taken up with firefights, each side taking potshots at the other. The Taliban set occasional ambushes, but the US soldiers seem only to act as fire bait. They never seem to control the terrain. They set up key forts and mini-forts, and patrol on occasion. But the wider landscape is not theirs to control. Physically, the country is mountainous and thus favorable to guerrilla warfare rather than a mechanized army. And for all our space-based intel, it appears that knowing where the enemy is continues to be extremely challenging.

But the social landscape is even worse, completely incomprehensible to youngsters from the US. Sure, they have GPS, maps and doubtless all the intel our government can provide. But not knowing the local language is an enormous block. The soldiers are tongue-tied trying to relate to villagers through interpreters, hardly getting to first base, as it were, in the campaign for hearts and minds while they are busily tramping through the villager's homes and shooting up the countryside. Their lip service about projects and benefits for the villagers in return for cooperation could just as well have been spoken in Klingon.

Each village is manned by a skeleton crew of boys and ancient codgers. The women are sequestered, and all able-bodied men are off shooting at the Americans. Language barrier or not, the degree of possible cooperation could hardly be more clear. The film-makers don't investigate the local terrain either. They are fully embedded in that sense, not stepping beyond the wire of US control. Could they have clarified the degree to which, and reasons why, the local populace acceed to the terror of the devil they know over the foreign devil they had seen once before, in Soviet uniforms? Doubtful, I am sure, but the question virtually answers itself.

If the US were a traditional conquerer, this wouldn't make much difference. The Afghan men would be killed, the women sold off into slavery, and, as Rome did before us, we would call it peace. But we have renounced such wholesale terror and aim to behave by a higher moral code, as well as hoping to gain friends by practicing temperate and targeted warfare.

Were we even a traditional 20th century conquerer, we would have sent in far more more soldiers. The platoon of Restrepo is hopelessly out-gunned, despite their technical resources. If they had been welcomed as friends, a light footprint might have been sufficient. But at it was, near the border to Pakistan where the Taliban was comfortably ensconced as valued allies of the Pakistani government pursuing its bigoted war against all neighbors, in a rural region were the people are even more attached to their guns and religion (and control of their women) than they are in West Virginia, well, the welcome was not friendly at all. It was like being set down as a lonely platoon on the Ho Chi Minh trail and told to stop the traffic. In that case, as we now know, all the bombing in the world wasn't enough.

Our occupation of Europe after World War 2 succeeded largely because of cultural knowledge and affinity. We knew how to be friendly to a population utterly burned out by war, and even in Japan, we made friends in the wake of the nuclear bomb, due to Japan's strong Westernizing project that had been in motion for the preceeding near-century. In the Middle East, we seem to have very little cultural affinity. Islam is at the core of this, I think, as it combines a bigoted attitude towards infidels (and many forms of social and technical progress) with a lack of governing discipline that leads to endless free-lancing, militia formation, and romantic heroism. Why is government by a polygamous royal family in Saudi Arabia acceptable in the modern world, and accepted as the center and heart of the Islamic world? Yes, it resembles the feudal or even tribal orders of the past. But what kind of justification is that? When is the revolution in political theory and social justice going to happen in the Islamic world?

In Afghanistan, we started well ahead, as the population was not, on the whole, pro-Taliban. But social power is not always democratic, and in Afghanistan, it is a traditional and brutal competition between armed gangs, run by natural predators. Some youngsters from the US might have understood this, but not those in this man's army. Gang warfare is particlarly a matter of social knowledge, knowing were invisible lines are drawn, who is big, who is small, how far to push each person, and what each tag and sign signify. The soldiers of Restrepo are almost completely blind in this respect, which in combination with their other shortcomings made them rather unsuccessful.

But this was just a part of the larger policy. Where are we generally in Afghanistan? The country is slowly losing ground to the Taliban. The government is disorganized and corrupt. Without the US to prop it up and feed the maw of corruption, it is not really clear whether the central government is a going proposition. Which is somewhat odd for a culture so obsessed with morality and honor. Unfortunately honor is a very ambiguous sort of virtue, given to competitiveness and winning over all other considerations, causing suicide bombers to wear burkhas and the like. One may even take it as a cautionary tale for our own slow path towards hyper-competition and feudalism in the West.

After almost fifteen years of occupation / assistance, most Afghan's first allegiance still seems to be tribal rather than national. The cultural elite treat the national government as a part-time affair, good while someone else is paying the bills, but not essential to their power centers, which remain local, in the form of tribal structure, militias, local extortion rings, smuggling, and other pursuits that one might call organized crime. The police operate similarly, by bribery and abuse of citizens. We allied ourselves with the existing powers to get things done locally, while at the same time attempting to change the game nationally by setting up a veneer of democracy and modern bureaucracy in association with ostensibly friendly Afghans. It has been a confusing mess, as much to our own soldiers as to the Afghans whose hearts and minds we intended to change.

• Now that the Taliban has it so good, it can have fights among rival gangs.
• Evidently we have to get out of the Middle East because they really are nuts after all, and deserve their caliphate.
• Why the US needs to police the world, and needs more than kids to do it. Some good, some not so good arguments.
• On the other hand...
• A Mormon insurgent politely asks for change.
• What is going on in Asia and Japan, from a left perspective?
• More about the robots and unemployment, using the horse analogy.
• Decoding Republican love of small government.
• Neural oscillations track both speech and music.
• Image of the week- life expectancy across the US. The Red South needs better health care and lifestyle ... why are they so dead-set against it? Another aspect of feudalism.

Whatever Happened to Bangladesh?

Saudi funding sows a whirlwind of extremist Islam.

Bangladesh had a difficult birth, with war and something close to genocide. The irony is that the killers and rapists were Islamic co-religionists from West Pakistan, now called Pakistan. Bangladesh was saved by the Hindus of India, who drove Pakistan out of a country about which it cared evidently less than nothing. Yet Islam and Islamism survived, and seems to have come to the fore vs the other main cultural thread, which is Bengali culture.

Bangladesh has been in the news recently for the murders of four outspoken atheists, particularly the brutality and impunity with which they were carried out. Why? Why has the virus of Islamism found a home so far from the core Arab areas whose extremism we take for granted? Money seems to be the short answer. Money that funds innumerable mosques, madrassas, and a variety of terrorist groups. The private madrassa system in Bangladesh has grown enormously over the recent decades, now rivalling the state educational system, which has been forced to offer its own madrassas of a hybrid nature that combine modern and Islamic education.

The private madrassas couldn't exist without large infusions of money, (donations), since they are typically free to students. The government spends about 50 million a year on its own system of madrassas, which should give an idea of the money involved. A large amount for a poor country, but very little for a country like Saudi Arabia, whose petro-wealth makes supporting ultra-conservative Islamism all over the world relatively easy, both by way of state policy, and by private donations. Charity is a very important duty in Islam, and is prone to chauvanistic and political interpretation, funding jihadist groups, proselytizing, and fundamentalist educational activities.

There are two important native institutions of Islamism in South East Asia. One is the Deobandi school or movement, and the other is the Jamaat -e-Islami political party. Deobandis are more conservative than the mainstream Barelvi Muslims, who preserve local and mystic Islamic traditions. The Deobandis are more by-the-book, holding to the Hanafi school mostly, and putting importance on following some major tradition. This contrasts with the evern more extreme movements like the Salafists, who renouce all the traditions after the first three generations and thus base their interpretations on the Koran and Hadiths, without regard to current scholarship, mainstream schools, or famous Islamic universities.

So there are more or less Calvinist schools at work here, from the culturally traditional Barelevis, who are nonetheless quite divisive in their own right, having supported the Pakistan movement and countless instances of anti-Hindu violence, to the Islamically traditional Deobandis, to the Islamically fundamantalist Salafis and Wahhabis. Of the latter, if they had wanted to recapture the Islamic golden age, the roughly 500 years from 800 to 1250, with its cosmopolitanism and scholarship, that would be a worthwhile enterprise. But trying to recapture the days of the first generations, with their incessant bigotry and warfare, in the current age, is naturally a recipe for global disaster.

The Jamaat -e-Islami is analogous to the Muslim Brotherhood, (or the Christian Fellowship, for that matter), in working assiduously to propagandize for a religio-political fundamentalism and to place its acolytes in powerful positions. It has an interesting distain for nationalism, viewing the modernizing movements of Nasser and others in the mid-20th century Islamic world as distractions from the world-wide revolution that would bring Islam to the head of affairs globally. It was outlawed for its violence in supporting West Pakistan at independence, but was later legalized by an Islamic dictator and now is a minor party with outsized power in the parliamentary system of Bangladesh.

The extent of funding flowing from the Gulf states to Islamist enterprises in Bangladesh is very hard to judge, as it goes under many routes and guises. There are several billions in remittences from individual Bangladeshis working in the Gulf states, (and subject there to Islamist propaganda, naturally), perhaps a billion in direct foreign aid, extensive business relationships including the curious and secretive practices of Islamic banking, and unknown billions in private charity. This is not to mention the Haj and its associated opportunities for propaganda. One example: "The Saudi Arabia-based al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, banned internationally by United Nations Security Council Committee 1267, has come under suspicion, along with other charities from the Middle East, for financing terrorism in Bangladesh."

All this is working against the indigenous, orthogonal culture of Bengal, which is Buddhist/Hindu as well as Islamic, literary, and rather non-violent. A recent podcast about Rabindranath Tagore tells some of the story. But Bangladesh was and remains torn between its Bengali and Islamic identities. The Islamic union with Pakistan certainly went sour, (as do all relationships with Pakistan, apparently), yet with the Gulf states putting their thumbs on the scale for decades, we end up with continuing schizophrenia, culture war, Islamic fundamentalism, and violence.

Will Islamism burn itself out anytime soon? It seems to be powered, not by its own logic or success (see the problems ISIS has in governing anyone in a popular manner), but as a bitter reaction to the long-term decline of Islamic culture, set against colonialism and continuing cultural dominance of the West. A reaction to modernity; to Muslim powerlessness in the modern worlds of technology, cultural soft power, military power, scholarship, creative arts, feminism, gay rights, political theory, ... the list could go on. There is a great deal to be bitter about. In Bangladesh, the majority remains moderate, democratic, and peaceful. Why outsiders like the Saudis and Pakistanis would want to stir up hatred is, as usual, not clear except on a psychoanalytic plane. As usual, a belief system seeks to bolster its tenuous believability by making as many people adhere to it as possible, by fair means or foul, since success is itself a form of truth in the Darwinian world of culture and ideas.

• Another review of Islamism in Bangladesh, if a bit right wing. 
• ISIS as (non-) governing organization- soft power, branding, governance. Who governs better?
• Afghanistan is doing better than Iraq. Which is not saying a lot, but perhaps enough.
• Must atheism be irritating, and irritable?
• You go, Carly!
• It would be hard for the GOP to be more 1%-friendly.
• A steaming pile of BS from theologian John Millbank.
• Monetary policy has real effects, only not on ideologues.
• To wingnuts, running a monetary system is "socialist".
• Lack of shame among economists.
• Jeb! ... for a significantly creepier foreign policy.
• Solow on rent.
• Science fiction as prescient cultural critique.
• Another organism with more genes than we have.

Atheists Have No Morals

A "truth" one comes up against all the time. And what are morals, anyhow?

You hear it all the time, as an atheist. "How can you be moral if you don't believe in anything?" Or some variation, perhaps citing Nietzsche in more sophisticated versions. It is an earnest enough question, given the life-long indoctrination that religions practice, and the dependence- intellectual, social, and moral- they foster.

In large part it is a tribal badge, this conviction that we are the good ones and the others are not good. Without even looking into the particulars of a community's moral code, one can assume that they view theirs as good, and those of outsiders as deficient if not evil. Even the mob has its code of honor. Religious community membership commonly functions as a social signal of trustworthiness, of goodness, good intentions, and proper upbringing. It was not long ago that everyone had to be a member of a local church, or the national church, or was shunned. The Muslim world exemplifies this tendency, currently.

In that it does not differ much from nationalism, or membership in any other club, masonic order, Elks lodge, etc. But religions claim much more. The typical religion not only forms a social club, but to validate its existence and inflate its importance, claims to know mysteries of which the lay bumpkin is ignorant- the nature of the cosmos, the ultimate reality, and the desires of god. It offers cosmic as well as personal transcendence, and offers an objective moral order. This is the rock on which believers lay their bigotry, that they have answers to moral questions which for the atheist have no answers, leading presumably to despair at best, murder at worst.

This moral order has been under continuous renovation from time immemorial, but that doesn't keep theologians from claiming that it is objective and absolute, thus giving them the power to conflate what supposedly is (what god wants) into what you should do. God said X, therefore you must do X. Only, so much scripture has piled up in the mean time, so full of conflicts and ambiguity that there is simply no way to a clear interpretation. On the one hand, this means that all fundamentalisms are doomed to be just as subjective and self-serving as the modernist / deviationist interpreters, and on the other hand, it means that the devout need the services of some interpreter, to render fatwas out of the thicket of their so-called objective text.

So it is not really objective after all, and one empathetic judge or practitioner can do more for her flock than gaggle of rule-divining theologians. But wait, isn't the mere proposition of an objective moral order worth something, and better than the utter nihilism of atheism? Isn't the dedication to seeking moral truths, however far we are from discerning or attaining them, one key point of religious engagement and a noble quest that separates us from the brutish, thoughtless, care-less atheists? And even if the moral order is ambiguous, isn't the promise of a deity who sees all and judges all a prod to good behavior?

Well, those are fascinating questions. If one doesn't really know what is good in a reliable, clear way, however, it hardly seems helpful to have an eye of Sauron watching our every move, or the promise of eternal suffering if we take a wrong step. Theologians themselves are all over the map on the reality of hell and the nature of posthumous justice. The Catholic church recently excused babies from their stay in purgatory, after centuries of selling indulgences and demanding pennance of endless varieties from its adherents to get their loved ones out of it. The fact of the matter is that we behave as if our conscience is our final judge, whatever our theological commitments. It is our conscience that is the field of moral battle, whether it is cultivated by a program of guilt and self-hatred, one of compassion and calm introspection, or one of empathy with other living beings of all kinds including humans.

More interesting is the question of the quest for moral laws. Our legal systems are always straining to make their apparatus and judgements seem as objective as possible. Guilty! Innocent! The lure of certainty seems to be a strong feature of human nature, and this illusion is surely of practical benefit to our systems of communal judgement. A cautionary example can be seen in the sorry state of our Supreme Court, which has, though its nakedly ideological bickering and party-line decisions, ceded any claim, even illusory, to objective, above-the-fray judgement.

So each religious tradition toils on, seeking that final, absolute moral object that will tell its children to go to bed on time and to turn off their cell phones. And the kicker is that they phrase this as finding out "what god wants", as if unloading all the ethical work to someone else elevates our moral nature. As you can probably tell, I regard this as quixotic at best, for our morals are very much ours, and are fundamentally subjective and biological. Had we no empathy for our fellow creatures, all would be lost, whatever the absolute moral code. Conversely, the person who cares for others and expands her sympathies to the largest possible extent has no need of theological commandments.

So seeking for objective morals is a fool's errand. But that doesn't mean that there is no room for serious moral inquiry, particularly that premised on things that are real, like the existence, needs, and desires of others and our many levels of individual and communal interest. It is complicated enough without invoking unseen phantasms.

Which brings us back to the atheist. Once one understands that there is no moral high ground for those who pound on bibles or cart about granite slabs inscribed with the ten commandments, and that communities will typically grant themselves moral superiority whatever the content of their codes and practices, (one is reminded of the extensive forgiveness the Catholic church lavished on its wayward priests), one is left on a much more even playing field.

Religious people are often perplexed by the apparent uprightness of atheists. They seem to be smart, well-behaved, oddly capable of putting up a good front and not getting into trouble. What could be going on? Statistics of course reinforce that impression. Atheists are indeed better-behaved than religious people, staying married longer, murdering less, having fewer abortions, committing less crime, etc. Truly, a conundrum.

It almost seems as though attentiveness to reality, not only in the form of science, evolution, and similar nerd-ish fixations which lead many atheists to their philosophy, but in the forms of civic affairs, politics, history, and psychology- attentiveness in short, to other people- might form a sounder moral education than indoctrination in some crazy story about master beings, resurrections, perfect scriptures, and eternal life. The humanist viewpoint (which is the general atheist position) may not have the plotline and passion of dramatic religions, but that may be a point in its favor. While religions often foster the best in humanity, they frequently seem to go astray, whether due to inattention in the face of the distracting, even overwhelming, story they carry, or directly from some part or interpretation of that story that gives official license to violate the most basic elements of human morality. The Israel-Palestine conundrum comes to mind.

When pressed, a religious person may offer that, sure, given the culture we have inherited, most atheists still manage to do alright, but this comes from the solid grounding that Christianity has given the West (insert culture and religion of choice here). At some point, if religion continues to decline and our cultures lose this moral anchor, there is no telling what might happen. Even those idyllic quasi-socialist countries of Scandinavia that are the most secular in the world still have state churches and their rich moral patrimony.

This gets the correlation all wrong, however. It is the most religious countries that are the most backward, and the least that are socially more just, with lower crime, incarceration, etc. If religion were having all these salutary effects, why aren't the most religious countries the happiest, and the least most ridden with crime and immorality? But we see the exact opposite. It is almost as though religion is a counter-reality coping mechanism that is most attractive in countries mired in poverty and corruption, if not causing poverty and corruption. And that it seems to be unnecessary in effectively atheist countries like Luxembourg, Norway, and Denmark, either personally to help people survive adverse conditions, or communally to foster good behavior.

Additionally, one should realize that in the West, Christianity had over a millenium of free reign during the Dark and Medieval Ages. Much good was done, but I think on balance, the moral tenor of the West has increased considerably since that time, in the wake of the Enlightenment. It was the Enlightnment that generated secular concepts like fundamental human equality, human rights, democratic government, rationalism in public policy as well as scientific investigation, and much more. As ideals, they owe quite a bit to the preceeding religious conceptions, but were remade on a secular basis that made them far more effective, as it was the church itself that was a significant source of oppression, corruption, and obscurantism. We have gone to far greater moral heights in the modern age than were ever achieved previously, even while we grapple with enormous problems of scientific & political success. There were several horrible atheist movements and governments in the 20th century, which must be noted, but which have thankfully each been substantially reformed if not eliminated. Each could be seen as a religious movement of an idealistic, fanatical sort, at least in sociological, if not theological, terms.

Lastly, what of personal spirituality? Even if religions make people no more moral, empirically, than other philosophies, and even if they are factually false, and even if theology is a parody of scholarship, isn't the personal resonance with our surroundings, deep questioning, and quest for some kind of transcendence a significant feature of humanity, and of human morality?

I would actually agree with that, with some caveats, since the atheist is, in reality, just as spiritual as the religious person. The problem is whether one indulges this innate impulse with inferred pseudoscience and systems of social control based on hosts of invisible beings. The wonders of nature remain wonderous whether one chalks them up to deities or not. Religion is an *example of humans yearning for understanding and meaning, but is far from the apotheosis or sole source of meaning, let alone legibility for understanding the world. It is healthy for people to share their spiritual questions, insights, and commitments with each other, which is why not just religions, but academies, libraries and universities were invented. Here is where love- for spirituality is really the love of life and the world around us- is exercised as the freedom to be interested in and draw meaning from ... other people, phenomena of nature, arts and self-expression, and the best thinking that humanity has to offer.

This is transcendence with discipline, making of ourselves better beings, morally as well as intellectually. The idea of getting on the good side of an invisible being, or counting on another life better than this one, if such theories are not well-founded, seems a little cheap in comparison to humble dedication to slow betterment in & of this life.

• Annals of religious BS. Being personally related to god prevents drug abuse: "We have multiple ways of knowing: we have intuition, we have rigorous logic, we have investigation. We need to use them all. They’re all important, valid forms of perception."
• Annals of really serious religious BS.
• Some people call it mystery, others call it BS.
• Annals of denial: rise of the "nones" = culling of those "pretend Christians".
• Atheism is on the rise in the Middle East.
• Keeping tabs on Syria. And Iraq.
• On being wrong, and being really, really wrong.
• Virtually any existing condition is "Pareto optimal".
• Climate action is needed immediately.
• Happiness is an institutional, social issue.
• Banks are too big, and we can make them smaller.
• What is the problem with Keynes? Just imagine if government worked consistently against economic feudalism instead of for it.
• Were the founding fathers Keynesians?
• Finally, a church I can relate to.