What Would be an Effective Carbon Tax?

Carbon taxes could be effective if they are high enough. None are high enough now.

Look around, and you are struck by the myriad ways we use and waste fossil fuels. Live pigs are shipped by the airplane load from the US to China. Wildfires caused by global warming are fought with tanker airplanes. Plastic shopping bags by the trillion are churned out for single use followed by permanent entombment. Back-country hikers rely on helicopter rescues to get them out of jams. And of course we burn them with abandon for transport, heat, and electricity. Fossil fuels are far too cheap- from merely an efficient use perspective, quite apart from their disastrous role in climate heating, other forms of pollution, and overall sustainability.

The last decade has seen astonishing progress in renewable energy technologies, bringing them to par price with fossil fuels or even cheaper. But this price relationship is misleading, since it only reflects the low-hanging fruit of adding sporadic power to a grid that runs largely on fossil fuels with highly flexible dispatch characteristics. Making progress to a fully renewable and stable grid, and extending this to transportation, industrial processes, and chemicals will take vastly more work, including technologies not yet in hand.

We have such a long way to go to decarbonize.

The most  effective way to do this is to price the vice: price CO2 emissions. A uniform price will reach all the uses of fossil fuels, (I would add biomass as well, which generate CO2 emissions just the same), and harness the same capitalist motivation that has spent decades thoughtlessly expanding their destructive use. Government regulation can do a great deal, and is gradually driving coal to oblivion. But it will not be enough to drive the more complete transition that is needed, especially at the speed required. Climate heating is already rampant and highly destructive. 2040 is a mere 18 years away- nothing in infrastructure terms, and not much more in transport vehicle lifetimes. Natural gas remains the fuel of choice across the electric grid, residential, and industrial applications. Within twenty years, it needs to be demoted to minor status.

So what would be an effective carbon tax? One can take the baseline to be the carbon cap and trade system instituted by California, which ends up as an auction price for carbon emission credits. This is a very light tax with lots of exceptions, which has had a commensurately light effect. The price currently stands at ~$23 per ton of CO2 emitted. This is equivalent to about 22 cents per gallon of gasoline. This is not going to change many people's behavior, obviously. At ten percent or less of the retail price, this scale of tax is not going to drive a transition to electric vehicles. Overall in California, this tax brings in roughly a billion to two billion dollars per year, and is thought to be having a beneficial effect, but only as a fractional part of a much broader portfolio of regulations and policies.

In Sweden, the carbon tax is over $130 per ton. This is more significant, on the order of a dollar per gallon of gasoline. Again, there are so many exceptions, especially for heavy industry, that it touches only forty percent of emissions. Overall, it has caused only an eleven percent reduction in transport carbon emissions. Europeans pay much higher prices for motor fuels to start with, for many reasons beyond the carbon tax, so the relative effect of even such a larger tax is small. Europeans already use gasoline at a rate roughly one fifth that of the US, so are already very thrifty. We can expect in the US to have much greater elasticity to higher fuel prices, assuming a bit of political maturity instead of whining about our god-given right to cheap gasoline. 

At the same time, unless alternative fuels, forms of transport, or social behaviors appear, especially in the truck and other heavy vehicle segments, this kind of tax would still have limited effect and serious economic costs. So the modeler and prognosticator has to wonder where the response to carbon taxes will come from. The pandemic showed that we can telecommute very effectively, thereby saving prodigious amounts of fuel. Tesla has shown the way in electric vehicles- a segment that had previously been brutally decimated by GM in various bait-and-switch schemes. Hybrid technology is edging into in larger cars and transit. It will take a big price signal to switch these markets in a dramatic way. Even doubling the price of gasoline, which in the US would take a carbon tax on the order of $400 or more per ton of CO2 emitted, would only bring our fuel prices to those of Europe, which still drives, has traffic jams, and emits vast amounts of CO2 from the transport sector. Such a tax would bring in about $400 billion per year in the US, easily within the normal taxation and economic capacity of a $20 trillion economy.

Yet now there are replacement technologies, so a carbon tax will, in classic economic fashion, create change, not just disgruntlement and economic pain. It will also bring forth more replacements, while working at every margin to drive conservation. Do we need continued technology investment? Absolutely. Do we need more public policy and infrastructure investments, such as reducing give-aways to the fossil fuel industries, charging them for their many immediate as well as long-term harms, and reconfiguring electrical grids and natural gas grids? Yes. A carbon tax is an accellerant to save the biosphere from incalculable harm. Its revenue can be administered right back to citizens or into the government accounts, displacing other taxes. So its net economic effects could be minimal, even while its effects on economic reconfiguration and conservation would be strong. 

• All laws must be enforced, or what good are they?
• No wonder the internet has gone to the dogs.

Group Selection

Every new form of biological organization becomes a new unit of natural selection

Group selection has been a controversial topic in evolutionary studies. Indeed, the whole matter of where selection operates has been a confusing mess. Richard Dawkins battled his way to fame by arguing that genes were the target of selection, and that we as animal bodies were merely automata driven to unwittingly propagate them by various unconscious means. When considering the unit of selection, one could go even to the individual nucleotide, which is ultimately what is extinguished or propagated by the action of mutation and selection, plying its tiny oar towards the survival of its gene, its genome, its cell, its organism, its society, ... its blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England!

Traditionally, the individual organism has been viewed as the main unit of selection. But can groups, when they form societies like bee hives or human tribes, be objects of selection as well? A paper reviewing the mathematics of evolution and selection makes the crucial distinction between the mechanism underlying heritability of traits, which might be a gene or nucleotide, and the unit of selection, which is the level of biological organization that exhibits traits upon which natural selection acts. The color of our eyes may be a cellular and organ-level trait, based on genes and nucleotides, but the unit of selection remains the individual, since that is where selection- via mate choice, disease, and whatever other ramifications eye color may have- acts directly to promote or inhibit reproduction. Likewise, social traits such as altruism, cooperation, detection and policing of cheaters, etc. may be in large degree be relevant and selected at the individual level, but at least some of their power and selectivity comes in the competition between groups, i.e. group selection.

It should be clear that selection happens at all sorts of levels, indeed at every level where a new form of biological organization emerges. The "unit of selection" is not singular, but manifold, and is defined, not absolutely, but by the level and properties of the trait being considered. We who inhabit multicellular bodies have pretty definitively ended competition / natural selection among the cells that compose us- those cells are not individual units of selection, since they do not persist after we are gone (even in the case of cancer where their replication has gone haywire). The closest might be competition among male sperm cells, which evidently do compete in their final voyage, though not to the extent of taking up arms against each other. Thus generally, our genes are only indirectly targets of selection, in that they generate traits that manifest on the cellular, individual, and indeed group level, with consequent selection at those levels and differential reproduction that change gene frequencies in the future.

This is called multi-level selection. The socio-biologists got into hot water back in the 1970's by asserting that group traits are at least in part biologically based, as are individual psychological traits, and thus that groups must act as units of selection. This did not sit well with the politically correct of the day, who wanted as a matter of principle to believe that humans (and especially subgroups such as ethnicities and races) are all created equal, and that any talk of heritability of traits such as intelligence, aggressiveness, altruism, etc. was, if not wrong, at least socially devisive and certainly damaging to a proper communist / constructivist view of the malleability of the human condition. While constructivist views of our social psychology, relations and conflicts certainly have significant truth, they can be taken too far, such as the arch-feminist idea that male-ness is purely a social construction, and that some counter-programming is all it would take to make a utopian, de-gendered world.

I'll scratch your back ...

But that is all in the past, and not only are social and group traits increasingly recognized as biological and to some degree heritable, but our evolutionary history is unthinkable without a lot of specific socially relevant traits being encoded, evolved, and put to the test in group-group competition, whether via direct competition or just relative success of independent groups without direct interaction. A set of papers made a review of this field and developed a general mathematical treatment of multi-level selection (MLS), postulating that any biological entity or level of organization can be a unit of selection- when traits can be defined pertaining to that level. This is especially relevant to emergent traits that can not be defined at lower levels of organization. 

Alcoholism, for instance, is hard to define at the cellular or single gene level, but can be easily defined at the organismal level. So it is selected at the level, where individuals suffer and die due to its effects and impair the lives of others along the way. While it necessarily has genetic components and heritability, and those genes can be thought of as being selected for or against, they often drag along many other genes, and have complex relations with other genes in the trait's expression, leaving the definition of the trait and its interaction with natural selection at the individual level. The unit of selection is a separate concept from the genetic and developmental processes that generate the trait. In alcoholism, the adult is the unit of selection, consituting a collection of characteristics that develop out of genes and other sources, whose frequencies may change based on that selection. 

"The genetical theory of MLS ... describes the action of group selection in terms of change in a genetical character. As discussed in the previous section, a genetical score may be assigned to any biological entity that contains genes – such as an entire population – and change in this genetical score can be computed, irrespective of how that population is subdivided into groups and individuals, or the biological level of organization at which the corresponding phenotype actually manifests. ... the theory of natural selection is ‘genetical’: this adjective pertains to the medium by which characters are inherited, rather than to the unit of selection itself."

 

It may be that all this is just a matter of convenience and book-keeping, as traits are defined (by us) on a macro basis. A gene's-eye view of the situation would focus on its own gains and losses in the rough and tumble of life. But in that case, we could not speak of alcoholism as a trait, but would have to speak of the gene's eye view of all the pressures it finds itself under, which would range widely over molecular, cellular territories and beyond, and violate our basic conceptions of a trait that is under natural selection. That is why a trait is defined at a particular level of organization where that characteristic becomes manifest, rather than at at gene level. There is no gene for alcoholism, though the trait is composed of / developed out of many heritable elements.

Imagine, in contrast, that alcoholism had no genetic component at all, but was purely random in genetic terms, not even affected by, say, genetic susceptibility to advertising blandishments. Such a trait would be subject to natural selection (i.e. death and other forms debility). But all that selection on the trait would have no effect on the next and future generations, due to its lack of heritability. It would have no genetic implications, by definition. So the unit of selection and trait being selected are separate issues from the genetic elements that might underpin it, particularly the degree or lack thereof of its genetic basis. 

While we are discussing this particular trait, it might be worth noting that in group terms, affinity to alcohol might be considered a positive trait, contributing to group bonding through the ages. Thus alcoholism might be a matter of stabilizing selection, trading off between its individual harms and its group benefits, particularly in the prehistoric setting where alcohol concentrations tended to be low, social controls strong, and alcoholism proper quite hard to develop.

This discussion, based on the paper series, is all based on the Price equation, which apparently underlies the field and is an extremely general statement / definition of natural selection. It contains basically two terms, which provide for a separation between the aspects of biological change derived from natural selection, and all the rest of the sources of change- drift, environmental change, etc. The selection portion it expresses as co-variation between traits in two populations (such as in successive generations) and the success of individuals (or other units of selection) carrying that trait. The whole equation rests on four key terms, none of which are explicitly genetic:

• The unit of selection- the biological organization that exhibits the trait, whether an individual, group, etc.
• The arena of selection- the population of units within which selection and evolution take place.
• The character under selection- the trait at issue, at whatever appropriate level of organization.
• The target of selection- the quantity (fitness) by which the character / trait is either good or bad, thus being selected.

As far as the unit of selection and the trait that pertains to that unit, any level will do, as long as it corresponds with a unit, or trait, that is definable to us and selectable in nature. 

"Between-group selection is directly analogous to standard, individual-level natural selection, but with the group taking on the role of the unit of selection, the group's phenotype acting as the character under selection and group fitness being the target of selection."    

"... by framing selection in its full generality from the outset, Price's equation reveals that kin and group selection are components of natural selection, and we obtain their dynamics by drawing them out of—rather than adding them into—the basic form of Price's equation. Moreover, by showing how the kin selection and group selection viewpoints both emerge from the mathematics of natural selection, Price's equation shows that these are not competing hypotheses for the evolution of social behaviour but simply different ways of conceptualizing the very same evolutionary process—and that a fierce, decades-long debate had been largely over nothing."

"For group selection to overcome selection within groups, less than one successfully reproducing migrant may be exchanged per two populations per population lifetime. ... Indeed, if groups are long lived, successful migrants must be very rare, and within-group inbreeding intense, for group selection to prevail over equally intense within-group selection."

Each level of selection can operate on many different traits, however, some of which may not directly conflict. So leaving aside the direct competition between individual and group interests, there is a rich field of action for group selection. This observation of the great sensistivity of group benefits to the rate of migration, especially for traits that conflict between individual and group benefits, gives us a clue about the origins of tribalism, which makes a practice of accentuating infinitesimal differences (or entirely imaginary ones) and using them to justify xenophobia, war, and genocide. It is a key legacy of evolution, particularly group evolution, and one that we struggle to overcome.

So group selection is perfectly consistent with evolutionary theory, (though some rather testy controversies remain). Does that mean that racism is OK? Do group differences justify tribalism and oppression? Well, our instinct for tribalism is certainly testament to a long evolutionary history of group selection, with its tireless focus on tiny, or even nonexistent, differences. The fact is that among humans, group differences are always swamped by within-group variation. We also do not generally discriminate so harshly against the differently abled and neuro-diverse *within tribes as we do against those we perceive outside them. So the practical and moral basis of discrimination and oppression is very poorly founded. True group selection is also virtually powerless against high migration rates, which we have throughout the modern world in any case. Thus the tribal instinct, which is now so flexibly deployed for nebulous groupings as nation states or sports teams, is totally out of its natural element, were we even inclined to mount some new eugenic project of any nature, whether individual or group.

• What it's like.

Sustainable Economics or Growth Economics?

A transition is needed.

A mantra of Americal economics has, since inception, been growth- growth at all times and at all costs. Times of recession are to be feared and gotten through as quickly as possible. Growth has made us a superpower in all our technological, political, and economic glory. But times are changing, as we widen our horizons to be planetary stewards and look increasingly to a future that extends out centuries and millennia, and whose foundation requires, therefore, sustainability. It is clear that we have to look at growth differently.

Economic growth comes from both population growth and growth in productivity / technology / efficiency. How do these relate and are both necessary? Aside from specific contractual problems such as those of Medicare and Social Security in a stable or declining population world, is economic vitality dependent on population growth? I think only slightly. We continue to need economic growth that comes from technological advancement and operational efficiency. The former is highly dependent on research institutions largely staffed by apprentice researchers, and generally on a supply of well-educated young people at their creative and energetic peak. Employers also value the malleable and cheap labor of the young over the grumpy labor of the old. But efficiency gains come from experienced older people as well, with accumulated technological and organizational knowledge, and better people skills. 

The US has been used to population growth, and many think that a lack of population growth would represent demographic, even economic, catastrophe. The Social Security system is one example of a generational transfer system which at inception relied on short life-spans to control expenses, but now relies on an ever-growing population of workers to fund the ever-lengthening retirements of our now much-healthier population. Likewise, low wage sectors such as agriculture rely on a mostly illegal population of mostly young workers from Latin American countries. How would our most essential industries operate without them? 

One can sense a sea change in our culture, however. A century ago, immigrants were welcomed (with racist caveats). Now, they are not so welcome. A half-century ago, infrastructure went up in profusion to build out suburbs, freeways, airports, universities, and all the other periphernalia of an optimistic new technological and political age. Now it is crumbling, most suburbs fight against growth, and as a result, housing prices indicate that we are collectively unwilling to accommodate more population in this most concrete of ways. 

The US population is an historical story of growth, but is leveling off.

So whether we want it to or not, population growth is leveling off and we are approaching a more stable demographic structure, in economic and other terms. This has been an unconscious, subjective response of the population at large to various hedges to growth and optimism. One can see it in the newly embittered politics, which seem more zero-sum instead of seeking growth for all. One can see it in the attitude of the elites who think nothing of grabbing all they can, and then taking some more, without a thought for the future of the collective culture or the downtrodden and "essential" workers who make it all go. One can see it in the increasingly dystopian futures shown by Hollywood. And one can see it in the degradation of resources, as forests burn up, aquifers dry out, fisheries are fished out, and the air itself turns toxic. On an economic level, key resources are ever-harder to come by, and clearly are not sustainable systems. I have been reading a book profiling the Anaconda mining company, which dug completely through the legendary copper deposits of Butte Montana in under a century, ending in the 1980s and leaving an enormous superfund site featuring a tourist overlook. The same story happens in lumber, fisheries, aquifers, soil health, phosphate and nitrogen pollution / misuse, and many other resources. It is inevitable, for instance, that the landfills of today will be the mines of tomorrow.

So, we can sense that our way of life is reaching a stopping point. Objectively, we are living far beyond the Earth's carrying capacity even at current population. The issues go far beyond the urgent need to stop CO2 emissions to the atmosphere, to the whole array of resources we use. Humanity has experienced several resource crunches before, such as hunting out the megafauna of the Americas by the First Peoples, and various island colonizations that ended in degradation, extinction, and depopulation. We don't want to go there.

Economics holds forth the hope of growth and adaptation even in the midst of static or declining population, resource constraints and degradation. We can mine minerals from the sea floor, or on the moon! Well, this is not looking at the problem realistically, let alone sustainably. A sustainable system will recycle all metals, draw energy solely from clean sources, and insulate the biosphere from our wastes- solid, chemical, and gaseous. Where growth economics prices only human resource acquisition and drives organizations to offload waste and degradation as "free", sustainable economics prices in all the externalities that affect the future ability of the Earth to support us. 

Capitalism is, needless to say, not situated to do this, by its nature and design. Sustainable economics needs the state and other communal organizations to set the prices and rules within which capitalist organizations can operate, for the safety of the biosphere not to mention our own future. While regulation for various public goods is not a new paradigm, regulation for a thoroughly sustainable Earth system would be. We are far from that currently, even in the most progressive precincts. That is one reason why the strength of political systems is so important now. Frustratingly, they are going in the opposite direction, under precisely the ecological and other growth-stunting stresses that cry out for communal and forward-thinking solutions.

• Al Gore
• What the?!
• And what the?!
• A rather jaundiced view of the US, from Korea.
• Secession is back on the table, apparently.
• Sleep is great!