Plato vs Aristotle

Some of us believe in forms- others, in particulars

As I continue reading up on the Gnostic issues posted last week, I encountered an very fine book. Richard Smoley's "Forbidden Faith" describes how, of the many, many heresies the Catholic church has stamped out over the years, the Gnostic heresy was and remains the "arch-heresy" (or thought-crime, in modern parlance). This is because it attacks the church at its empty heart- the substitution of ritual, dogma, and authority for direct, personal, idiosyncratic experience, which wells up perennially in new movements, drawing again and again on the same fount of personal "gnosis" of divine (if disorganized) experience.

More to the point I am interested in here, Smoley also touches on Greek philosophy's influence on the Gnostics. While Aristotle tended to work from the particular to the general, (perhaps too enthusiastically!), Plato was a partisan of ideals, whether in physics, theology, or ethics. Plato was a strong influence on Christianity, and on the Gnostics in particular, and Smoley reviews the Platonic influence briefly:

"Plato explains reality in a way that could be described as *esoteric. This word does not refer to the difficulty or obscurity of his though. Originally it meant that many of his teachings were given only to relatively advanced pupils, people who were 'further in' the circle (the word comes from the Greek *esotero, which means 'further in'). But it points to another meaning as well: it indicates that these teachings are essentially about inner experience. Unlike modern thought, which views the invisible and internal dimensions of life and thought as purely subjective (and hence unreal), esotericism says these inner dimensions have a genuine reality and can be known and intelligently described. Plato even went so far as to flip conventional wisdom on its head and say that the world we see is itself unreal. The solid objects of ordinary reality are merely copies of imitations of ideal entities that he called 'forms' - abstract images that exist in the realm of thought. The forms alone are real, Plato said, because they are eternal and unchanging, unlike the ceaselessly shifting world here below."

To which I scoffed: "Spoken like a true philosopher!" Whereupon my wife retorted: "But he's right!"

And there we have it- one of the most basic divides in human nature- whether we take ideas and inner experiences as realer than real, or whether we deprecate them as fantasy- subject, at best, to empirical verification. It is a difference that tests the very capability of language to describe. It is a deep temperamental difference. It is a difference at the heart of theist vs atheist debates, with one virtually incapable of understanding the other because each experiences a different reality. It also touches on the Gnostic vs Orthodox divide, because while Orthodox dogma is based to some extent on the visions and inner experience of an originating prophet/messiah and sundry saints, ultimate authority rests elsewhere- in the body of the church and its very this-world hierarchy.

Who is right? What could be a trickier question? As I've noted elsewhere, our inner experience can be construed as the whole world and the origin of the universe, all being conjured on our behalf by the magic of consciousness. And not only that, but any progress we make or change we author, whether outside or inside, has its origins within, in inspiration and motivation- in the mysterious workings of creativity. It is the artists, mathematicians, theorists, and leaders who regard reality as less than interesting- as mundane.

Earth-bound as I am, however, I would offer another perspective- that of population genetics and evolution. Inner vs outer-oriented temperament seems to be one of those fascinating traits subject to balancing selection. Which is to say that there is no one optimal temperament for being human, but only an optimal society made up of many different types of people having many different temperaments, each selected for in small proportion. After a week of Apollo 11 reminiscence, we are reminded of the merging of many talents, from the visionary to the detail-oriented, that made such an adventure possible. And also the various strands in ourselves as onlookers that make us appreciate it, from the mystical to the scientific.

Incidental links..

• I take back the aspersions I cast on the historicity of Jesus last week. Historians seem to give it general credence, so I will grant it high probability.
• Krugman gets it on medical reform
• Blue dogs hear unusual high-pitched sounds...
• Plumbing the economic crisis.
• Fie on blasphemy!

Gnosticism

Who were the Gnostics, where did they come from, and what did they think?

I happened to run across an small book published by the Theosophical press: "Jung and the Lost Gospels: Insights into the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Nag Hammadi library", by Stephan Hoeller. Unlikely as it sounds, it turned out to be excellent, providing extensive insight into pre-Christian and early Christian times as illuminated by those manuscripts. (See also a series of books by Freke and Gandy.) When first found, much of the Dead sea scroll material was taken under the wing of Catholic clergymen and suppressed for decades before publication. Why? The reasons become quite apparent when the connections between the two corpi, found only a year or two apart circa 1945 and 1946, are illuminated. Both are authentic expressions of heterodoxy, first vis-a-vis the Jewish power structure, then versus the nascent Christian powers, which the early church patriarchy had labored long and hard not only to refute, but to erase.

The Dead Sea Scrolls were written at least in part by Essenes, a Jewish mystic and healing sect of 150 BCE to 70 CE. They were motivated to go into exile (near the Dead Sea) by the usurpation (as they viewed it) of the priesthood by the Hasmonean (Maccabeean) dynasty, whose successful revolt against threatened paganism (of the Seleucids) had brought them to the throne in Jerusalem. The Essenes favored the more traditional priesthood, which fell to the tribe of Zadok and was separated from the throne, and cursed the Hasmonean "wicked priests".

Far from being a minor twig on the tree of Judaism, Essenes were a major dissenting group from the worldly (and religiously literalist/fundamentalist) Pharisees and Saducees. The Essenes were influential around the Eastern Mediterranean as healers and mystics (also called Therapeutae, and regarded as proto-gnostics), somewhat akin in reputation to the Egyptians who also were widely regarded to possess and transmit occult knowledge. It is apparent from this book and other studies of this time that the earliest Christian communities were very likely to have been direct descendents, by teaching if not by membership, of a wide-spread Essene community that had already templated essentially all the teachings either adopted and transmitted by Jesus or put into his mouth later on. Incidentally, the Essenes also prefigured the non-temple and non-sacrificial Judaism that was to become mainstream in the diaspora.

Their doctrines included sacramental meals, baptism, asceticism, pacifism, collectivism, antipathy to slavery, renunciation of animal sacrifice, belief in life after death, conviction of the fallen-ness of the current world, expectation of its immanent demise, and expectation of a savior, a "teacher of righteousness". Though the data is extremely sketchy, the book indicates that a teacher of righteousness was recognized circa 100 BCE, and was killed by the Jewish powers that be, prompting an outpouring of bitterness and apocalypticism, some of which is recorded in the Dead Sea Scrolls.

This clarifies substantially the timeline of the period, both in terms of the origins of the teachings involved, and in growth of the early Christian community, whose organized and far-flung nature within years of the presumed mission and death of Jesus is otherwise difficult to understand. It also clarifies some of the so-called heresies of the early Christian period, most of which were continuations and developments of the Essene creeds that were related to or eventually became what we call Gnosticism, and which became, as all mystical creeds will, anathema to an organized, hierarchical, orthodox patriarchy.

Which brings us to the other set of writings, the Nag Hammadi library of books, apparently secreted by a sect of Christian mystics in response to a decree banning non-canonical manuscripts, describing their gnostic beliefs dating back to perhaps 80 CE and thereafter, with the books themselves dating to the 200's and 300's CE. Gnosticism was equally derived from the Essene tradition as was Christianity, and both off-shoots intertwined in their Jesus-based theology, though the Gnostics were not as hung up on the literalism of the Jesus story, focusing on and recasting the mythical aspects of a story that was, in all probability, mythical to start with.

As a classic Gnostic deity, Jesus came into the world (in Plato's terms symbolized by the cave) to give knowledge of humanity's true nature and origin (god within), and hope of a better life after death, as long as one shared in this knowledge (later reduced in orthodoxy to the dictum to believe in Jesus or go to hell). The knowlege of the man being in god and god being in man, in agreement with typical mystical experience, expresses a one-ness with the universe which is both salving for the individual and also benificent in spreading love of all and everything through the community and the world.

The key difference between Gnosticism and orthodoxy lay in the value of personal, interior experiences. The Gnostics didn't concern themselves so much with organization and hierarchy as with continuing revelation by personal experience, led by a succession of visionaries providing "gnosis", or direct spiritual knowledge. For an organized religion, revelation has to stop somewhere, or else nothing that went before (and no one) can be authoritative. (This is a problem that Protestantism has dealt with repeatedly as sect after sect cleaves off and redivides in the absence of final authority). Gnosticism, on the other hand, drew continuously from streams of mystical thought and personal experience, starting with the Essenes (and many prior esoteric traditions), then extensively from Egyptian esoteric traditions, through John the Baptist and the associated messianic movements, continuing right up to the recasting of gnostic ideas in the present day by Mormonism and Scientology.

A key developer of Gnosticism proper was Simon (Magus), who was a Jewish Samaritan whose tradition was closely allied to that of the Essenes, being heterodox with respect to the major Jewish sects. He was a disciple of John the Baptist, and appears in the book of acts. He was apparently the originator of the peculiar brew of mysticism that became what we recognize as classical Gnosticism, which had both an intense concern with interior mystical experience along with a florid mythical vision of what those experiences meant. These visions made humans unfortunate inheritors of a fallen world subject to the whims of evil gods. But also possessors of a spark of divinity unknown to those not initated in the Gnosis, which was carried from the highest godly levels by Sophia, the healing and promethian goddess (and the inspirer of philo-Sophia, or philosophy).

Simon was prone to take spiritual flights, much like Muhammed after him and Ezekiel before him. More importantly, he had a female partner, Helen, much as Jesus had Mary Magdalene, who embodied wisdom granted by the goddess Sophia to seekers who were sufficiently pure and ready to renounce earthy things (equivalent to Chokma, the late Essene goddess). Gnosticism was far more open to feminine spritual powers and participation than was orthodoxy. The Nag Hammadi library contains alternate versions of old testament scriptures, liturgies, Gnostic commentaries and myths, especially concerning the feminine principle, lives and sayings of both Jesus and some apostles, as well as other learned miscellany such as portions of Plato's Republic and Zoroastrian texts.

To summarize, the Jesus story is essentially a variant of pre-existing proto-gnostic myths and motifs shared by esoteric pagans and the Essenes, for which an actual person by the name of Jesus may or may not have given further impetus. Paul may have been a gnostic who had little to say about Jesus as an actual person. The later church, in the hands of Irenaeus, Tertullian, and other propagators, writers and forgers, came to insist that their story, unlike all the other stories, was really, really, really true, as a badge of differentiation among the many honestly mythical cults of late Roman times. The story got altered, hardened, and repeated in a quadruplicate set of tales, while scores of competing stories were erased and their adherents hounded out of the church. After which the church contracted an alliance with the Roman empire and commenced to convert the remainder of its inhabitants by force, followed by a long dark age.

Aside from the sad loss of honest spirituality in the wake of Christian literalism, one small irony of this story is that Gnostics have ever been in quest of man's true nature, which, by way of active imagination and spiritual seeking was believed to be partly divine, trapped in a realm of semi-darkness and semi-light, oppressed by an evil set of fallen angels, while receiving occasional messages of hope from the upper realms of total light where reside our ultimate progenitors. But the answer of our true nature has in the fullness of time duly arrived, courtesy of Charles Darwin. It may not be the exhalted answer of the Gnostic imagination, but if one cares about either the word "true" or the word "nature", the answer is in hand, in magnificent scope and detail.

"If the flesh has come to be because of the spirit, it is a wonder, but if the spirit has come to be because of the body, that is a wonder of wonders."

- Jesus, in the Gospel of Thomas

• Outstanding podcast on Gnosticism (second half) and the historicity of Jesus (first half).
• Interview with Stephan Hoeller, for those interested, quite lengthy.

Market medicine

There are two real market participants in the medical system- doctors and insurers. Who wins?

The New Yorker ran a deeply insightful piece by Atul Gawande on cost in the medical system. His conclusion was that cultural differences between areas of the country that show huge medical cost disparities (up to 3-fold between county-size areas) come down to how willing doctors are to fleece their patients, (financially speaking, of course).

In high-cost areas, doctors obey market incentives, ordering extra tests and procedures, buying ownership shares in hospitals and other facilities to which they then herd their patients, collecting kickbacks from drug companies and medical sub-contractors, and so forth. In low-cost areas, doctors are not so closely attuned to the modern medical market and have not caught on to how easy it is to make money by "practicing" a lot of medicine. Or they may be part of special systems like the Mayo clinic which has a dramatically different incentive system. Much of the pressure in high cost areas may arise unconsciously from an excess population of doctors, who then keep themselves in business the best way they know how.

Notable here is that the putative consumer is not really a market participant. As Obama recently told the AMA, "We (health care consumers) do what you tell us to do". Likewise, drug and device manufacturers show through their marketing who makes the choices, spending far more on swaying doctors (or telling patients to "ask their doctors") than on direct consumer marketing.

On the other side of the equation are insurers, who are trapped in a bizarre system of paying whatever doctors order, though slowly, reluctantly, and with a maximum of paperwork. Who wins? Obviously, the doctors win. Everyone wants the best care, and is willing to do what the doctors deem the best care, with "most" care often filling in for best if doctors are corrupt as well as lazy. Insurers can draw the line at useless treatments and outright fraud, but there is vast scope for plausible treatment up to that point, given the immense arsenal of modern medicine.

The implication for health care reform is that, if cost control and improved care are its goals, then doctor's (and insurer's) incentives need to be fundmentally changed. Creating new markets by which insurers get squeezed by customer/employer consortia, while also being further regulated to pay out all plausible claims and cover all claimants, will simply not address the problem. Reducing payment rates on a per-procedure basis, which is currently the typical method of cost containment, only motivates doctors to turn around faster- treat patients more rapidly, with less attention, and with more costly procedures. The problem is the piecework nature of medical reimbursement.

How can doctors be motivated to practice with patient outcome and cost as their true guides (in that order)? The article describes the success the Mayo clinic has had by paying doctors salaries and making promotions and raises dependent on teamwork and patient outcomes. This system is oriented towards teamwork and integrated care, counteracting the ever-increasing complexity of modern medicine. Teams are rewarded for their focus on patient well-being, and doctors can take the time needed to consult with each other and meet jointly with patients to coordinate care.

The amazing thing is that this system decreases overall cost, since doctors are not shooting at dart boards in hurried (and self-serving) attempts at diagnosis and treatment, but focus on each care situation with enough dilligence to make better diagnoses, thus achieving more efficient care. This dilligence includes reviews after the fact with colleagues, which is an essential part of medical school training, but then disappears for most doctors in practice today. Mistakes in diagnosis and treatment not only waste resources and time, but often complicate subsequent care and make the patient worse off, including, in some cases, killing them.

Switching to an integrated and re-incentivized system generally would not have much to do with who pays the bills- insurance could still be run by private insurers (constrained to pay on an HMO basis, perhaps) or a single payer system. The key part is to transform doctors from the atomized go-it-alone/treat-it-in-isolation private buccaneers of today into collaborative parts of an integrated system motivated to get each caregiving contact right rather than to make it pay.

Modern medicine, while amazing and definitively better than such alternatives as the old-fashioned shaman and "alternative medicine", still leaves very much to be desired. Understanding of many areas such as metabolic syndromes, mental illness, and cancer is still primitive, and treatments such as radiation, psychotropic drugs, and diet alterations are likewise a swamp of ignorance. Even when a great deal is known in an area of medical science, expecting individual practicing doctors to keep abreast of that knowledge is quite unrealistic.

Doctors are only human and face a medical literature of oceanic dimensions. Being in contact with colleagues for individual cases, while very helpful, will still not be enough. They will need computerized systems to assist with diagnosis and treatment, not only to put the medical literature at their fingertips, but also as expert systems that lead the diagnostic process to better outcomes, based on the constantly changing standards of care and advanced expertise.

Caveat Emptor Medicinae!

Incidental links:

• Typical case of bad diagnosis followed by hugely expensive treatment
• Tom Tomorrow wonders about health care
• Medical expert systems exist, but also have legal issues
• David Brooks, as usual, gets it half-right
• Our incurable superstition
• Excellent review of cap-and-trade

For the love of God

Theologians abuse rhetoric and call it philosophy

As I have become familiar with the writing of one of Dawkins's so-called "fleas", Eric Reitan, (author of a book entitled "Is God a delusion?"), it has become increasingly apparent that, while professionally employed as a philosopher, his methods are more those of a rhetorician wedded to a theology that he defends despite all incoming argument. An apologist, in short (which should have been clear from the title of his blog, "The piety that lies between").

The foundation of Reitan's view is that the spiritual experience (experiencing the transcendent, as he typically puts it) strongly, or even necessarily, implies that there is a transcendent order that exists separately from us that we are somehow "tapping into", or sensing by the modality of prayer or meditation.

His judgements are usually couched in smooth equanimity, such as: "True humility involves, as I have argued, being open to the possibility of a transcendent reality touching and transforming us in ways that offer wisdom unattainable through our ordinary cognitive faculties."

Who wouldn't want to be "open"? Who wouldn't want to be "humble"? Who wouldn't want to be open to "wisdom", let alone "reality"? The problems, however, are many. First is whether there is any sign of a transcendent realm, and second, even if there is such a realm, whether and how we have access to it, perhaps demonstrated by radical and accurate knowledge. On the other side is the competing hypothesis that points out that brain states like meditation are exactly those prone to imagination and subjective transport, and whose complete dissociation from reality is well-known by novelists, artists, and daydreamers of all stripes.

The modern scientific enterprise has blazed trails into actual reality beyond the wildest dreams of ancient philosphers, mystics, and theologians. Only the Indian Hindus and Buddhists, in their infinite rigor, came close to the vast stretches of time involved in the past eons of earth and cosmos. Scales from the great to the infinitesimal have far outstripped and defied transcendentalist description. Whatever conceptions had previously been floated about origins were fanciful tales (twice-told, in the case of Genesis) plucked straight from the imaginations of ancient poets. If they were in touch with transcendence, it was evidently with transcendent feeling, not transcendent reality-touching.

So not only has the vast knowledge of our current scientific corpus not found a transcendent realm, but those supposedly benefiting the most from transcendent wisdom have ended up wildly off the mark, usually spending their newly-enlightened time authorizing patriarchal systems, damning unbelievers, or creating bizarre food prohibitions (not to mention convenient rules about how many extra wives they could have).

Very well, the absence of evidence does not constitute the absence of transcendence, right? Perhaps the realm properly defined as perpetually beyond the reach of skeptical observation yet exists, and we have a special portal to it through the process of day-dreaming. But brain science has nothing but bad news on this front too. Brains are chemical entities, and either take in sensations from the outside world or compute on those sensations internally. Known modes of sensation have been widened substantially by modern cognitive science and neurobiology (body postion sense, several types of touch sensation, etc.), but no transcendent sensory mode has emerged. Indeed, studies of meditators have shown brain areas activated that made eminent sense in terms of reduced outward sensation and focus on imaginative and bodily inner states.

Again, the fruits of access to the transcendent realm also belie its existence, since one would think that the source of such wisdom would grant knowledge of amazing things- the origins of existence, the ground of all being, and the face of god. Yet the various faith traditions have come up with vastly differing elaborations of all three, almost as if they were making it up as they went along based on vague and common feelings, rather than observing some common and transcendent reality through the portholes of prayer.

One has to conclude that a great deal of humility is indeed in order- humility about transcendent claims. While naturalists, scientists, philosophers and people of good will are open to new findings and ways of looking at the world, the particular one of transcendent transport has proven something of a dry hole philosophically speaking, however beneficial it has been for the arts and for practitioner's health and well-being. Philosophers who insist in the teeth of evidence that there is something "veridical" about what is in essence day-dreaming are not only centuries out of date, but doing a serious disservice to their putative profession.

But hey, it could be worse. One of Reitan's colleagues at Oklahoma State University spends his time counting the number of persons within the person of god. One wonders whether OSU would hire a "philosopher" of Islam, or a "philosopher" of Voodoo, just to spice things up. Still, to see someone of Eric Reitan's eloquence and evident dedication to philosophy take the football of reason so far downfield only to decide to stop at the 10 yard line and call it a win remains disturbing.

Altruism through genocide

Did human morals and altruism arise from intergroup warfare?

One of the long-standing problems of evolutionary biology is how to account for altruism as a trait of human nature when the Darwinian mechanism is relentlessly individualistic. To sacrifice one's self for non-relatives is abhorrent to a dyed-in-the-wool Darwinist, and even towards relatives, the calculus yields rather modest sacrifices, rapidly attenuating with distance.

In "The Selfish Gene", Dawkins (following Williams) even proclaims the individual to be an epiphenomenon- the temporary abode of genes which are the true (and semi-immortal) objects of selection, to whom their habitation is a feeding and replicating robot. (One could make the same point about individual nucleotides within genes, to take this analysis to a reductio ad absurdum.) In contrast, Stephen Gould wrote a miasmic defense of multi-level selection that incorporated individuals, groups, and even species and higher groupings as objects of natural selection. But he was slightly ahead of his time, for group selection has only now begun to come back into the evolutionary literature in earnest.

It is to group selection we must turn to investigate the origin of moral traits, since morals (such as altruism) concern how we treat others, and especially how we moderate our selfishness in the service of larger groups. This is not a new story in evolution, since cooperation happens among bacteria, (mutualist associations among methanogens and methane oxidizers come to mind, as do other mixed species biofilms), plants (lichens are a simple example, as are corals), and insects (ants, termites, etc.), among many, many others. Grouping and cooperation has been a winning strategy many times over in the history of life, including the critical innovation of the eukaryotic consortium over its bacterial ancestors.

Darwin himself suggested this rationale in human evolution, proposing selection of groups with "a greater number of courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid, and defend each other ... would spread and be victorious over other tribes." (Descent of man, quote taken from the paper being reviewed). The problem has always been figuring out in quantitative population genetics terms whether this made any sense, especially how a strategy of altruism could survive against cheating from within the group as well as from gene dilution from outside sources. There are strictly individualistic rationales for some level of cooperation among organisms, but they never rise to the level of the ultimate sacrifice, as exhibited by cells in our body committing suicide rather than turn cancerous, or soldiers offering their lives on the battlefield.

Population genetics revolves around the concept of "fitness", which quantitates differential reproductive success. In common parlance, fitness refers to traits that enhance survival (thicker fur, higher intelligence, disease resistance, etc.), but as used in evolutionary biology, fitness refers to the end effect of trait differences, expressed in the proportion of the individual's genes in the next generation, divided by the proportion in the current generation. Neutrality would be a value of 1, and comparisons are usually expressed as differential fitness, between alleles of a gene, or between whole genomes. The author mentions that a fitness differential (or cost) of -0.03 would drive its occurrence from 90% of the population to 10% in 150 generations, illustrating how small differentials can have large effects over time.

The paper at issue, by Samuel Bowles ("Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors?"), is mathematical, creating a model of small populations with given amounts of gene flow from outside (or, conversely, inbreeding), given amounts of warfare in which groups extinguish other groups and expand accordingly, and given amounts of altruism, expressed as individual costs (death in warfare by warriors) and group benefits (success in warfare). Then the paper draws on various other sources to decide on reasonable bounds for these various values, plugs them in, and comes up with the finding that altruism in these simplified terms could be selected for, even at substantial individual cost.

The equation Bowles comes up with for his model is:

Where c is the individual fitness cost to altruists (set at 0.03, as above), k (kappa) is the probability per generation of being in a conflict with another group, L (lambda) is is the probability of group survival in such a contest, F(ST) is the inbreeding coefficient of the group (higher means more inbred), and n is the group size. The equality represents the boundary case, where increased c, the individual cost of altruism, breaks even versus its group benefits. These benefits are represented by L as arbitrarily adjusted (subscript A) by the presence of altruists, where an extreme value of 3.3 means that a group with 10% more altruists than its competitor suffers half the mortality in a contest. Bowles admits that there is no way to empirically estimate this parameter, and offers a curve of possible values, from 0 (no effect) to a high of 3.

Another key variable is delta, the overall rate of adult violent mortality (somewhat determinable empirically), taken to represent warfare in some proportion. k equals 2*delta, as a simplified estimate, assuming half the combatants win and half lose on average.

Bowles then estimates some semi-empirical values from the ethnographic and archaeological literature. First, for conflict-derived mortality (delta), he settles on 14% as an estimated rate of violent death in prehistoric cultures among all adults (note how vastly higher this is than what we experience in contemporary life). This is transformed to rates of conflict (k) and rates of defeat or victory in such contests (L), adjusted by the putative in-group altruism factor. Group sizes and inbreeding rates have been extensively studied elsewhere, so are not a special focus in this article. Group sizes are averaged at 26, (though an infinite group size is also treated), and several possible inbreeding coefficients (ratio of between-group genetic variance to total variance) are offered in the derived curves (below).

The graph shows solutions to this equation with these various values plugged in. The equation is satisfied and altruism favored for areas above and to the right of each curve.

"Wartime mortality (delta) and the effect of altruism on success in conflicts (L, or lambda A) sufficient for the proliferation of an altruistic trait with individual fitness cost (c)=0.03 for three estimates of the extent of genetic differentiation among groups (F(ST)). Shown are the values of c consistent with Eq. 6 for the estimated F values from (12, 17). The representative values of delta are from Table 2. Populations on the horizontal axis in italics are from the ethnographic sample; the rest are from the archaeological sample." (from Bowles, 2009)

So, granted that this is a quite artificial situation, and that I am no expert in the field, what this paper does is to establish inter-group selection as plausible and quantifiable mechanism in accounting for trait-based altruism in the form of warrior behavior and sacrifice. The empirical boundaries seem plausible, while some of the mathematical simplifications seem less so (in this model, each conflict results in extermination of one group and doubling of the other, for instance. On the other hand, all non-altruists get to survive if their group wins a war, while altruist warriors die with 20% probability). Specifically, the right-ward parts of the curves indicate that given realistic rates of death (delta) from conflict, altruism could be selected for despite substantial costs (c) and modest group benefits (L). There are many other possible rationales for selection of in-group altruism traits, so this setting of warfare should not be seen as exhaustive.

The analysis just codifies and works out in population genetic terms the basic insight that groups are quite evidently objects of selection. As long as there are genetically distinct human groups, and those groups are being killed by other groups, (richly detailed and cheered on in the old testament, in the epics of many other cultures, and recently witnessed in the Balkans, Rawanda, etc.), there is evolutionary selection of groups going on. One focus of this selection would then be for group-related traits, which is to say, suggestibility, altruism, willingness to sacrifice all, and even communal spirituality.

One clear reflection of this in human nature is the enormous importance we put on group membership versus outsider status. The ten commandments never had anything to do with non-Jews. Killing was just fine outside the group, and laws were only relevant inside the group. Indeed, their point was to cement group identity. The same is evident throughout ancient history. Greek cities of antiquity were in perpetual warfare with each other, either killing opponents or enslaving them into a life of (at best) modest reproductive success. Likewise, much of adolescence is devoted to acquiring membership and status relations within ever-shifting groups.

The lesson for today is quite simply one of globalization- the urgent need to unite humans in a single affective group, transcending the national groupings which have been so powerful both in focusing human aspirations for the last few centuries and in providing vehicles for mutual extermination. Thankfully, there are many forces carrying universal messages, from the Olympics and crass Western consumerism, to the amazing computer and cell phone revolutions that allow a global audience to follow video tweets from the streets of Iran.

Are religious messages a positive influence? Yes and no. Religious doctrine and organization has through history been perhaps the most powerful creator of group identity (and thus also enters into the group selection arguments above). The probability that any one form of religion will capture the entire market and thus unify humanity is exceedingly low (however fervently wished-for). The best hope therefore is to mitigate religious particularities, dialing down dogma such that spirituality retains an empathetic, unifying pan-humanistic strength, while the divisiveness of fabulistic and group-identifying doctrinal commitments fades away.

Incidental links

• Bowles gives series of lectures on the above subjects
• Oh, the kitchen computer... we hardly knew ye.
• Overfishing status, and cited article
• More on California's mess
• Communism, RIP
• Psychology and the housing mess

In the garden of Eden

Don't sleep, there are snakes: Life and language in the Amazonian jungle, by Daniel Everett

This is one of those rare books that inspires aching disappointment that it will have to end. It offers daredevil adventures, life and death drama, warm introductions to the most exotic people on earth, data that shatters received scientific paradigms, moving memoir, and deep meditations on the meaning of life and truth.

Daniel Everett has spent his life as a missionary and student of the language of the Pirahã (pronounced pee-da-HAN) on the Maici river in the central Amazon. Graduating at the top of his class from the Moody Bible Insitute, he undertook the most arduous possible mission to what were known as the most recalcitrant native people in the world- who had rejected missionary activity for 300 years and counting. Daniel became the first outside person to thoroughly understand the language and later served as translator for the Brazilian government which had no interpreters of its own when it began the process of protecting the tribe's land.

The Pirahã are people of many superlatives, numbering only about 300, strictly hunting and gathering, who do not indulge in abstractions, worry about the future, or regret the past. They trust only first-hand information, disregarding accounts from long ago or far away. They have no gods, creation stories or other myths (though they do see spirits in people and physical objects, and dramatize them in theatrical productions.) They treat children on equal terms as adults, with minimal correction and no corporal punishment. They have virtually no mental illness or problems with adolescent adjustment. The can't count, and Everett spent eight months to no avail trying to teach them that 1+1=2.

They are neither matriarchal nor patriarchal, nor do they prevent divorce and remarriage when one partner wants it. Their severest punishment is ostracism. They change their names from time to time, as the spirit strikes. Their language is tonal and has several distinct modes, including hummed, sung, yelled, and whistled. The male version has one more letter than the female version. Oh, and they are the happiest people on earth.

One of my favorite paragraphs was:

As I became more fluent in Pirahã, I began to harbor a suspicion that the people were keeping their speech simple for my sake. When they spoke to me, the sentences seemed short, with only one verb each. So I decided it would be worth listening more carefully to how they spoke to one another, rather than basing my conclusions on how they spoke to me. My best opportunity, I knew, would come from Báígipóhoái, Xahoábisi's wife. Each morning she talked loudly, beginning around five o'clock, sitting up in the hut in the dark, with Xahoábisi getting the fire going strong, only a few feet from my bedroom. She spoke to the entire village about what she had dreamed. She asked people by name what they were going to do that day. She told men leaving in canoes what kind of fish to catch, where the best places to fish were, how foreigners could be best avoided, and on and on. She was the village crier and gossip rolled into one. She was enjoyable to listen to. There was a certain artistry to her discourse, with her deep voice, the range of intonation in her talk (from very low to very high and back down again), the stylistically different way she pronounced her words- as if breath were going into her lungs and mouth rather than coming out. If ever there was a speaker that was speaking Pirahã for Pirahãs and not for me, the linguist, Báígi was it. Important for me, as I recorded then transcribed her sentences, they were structured identically to the sentences spoken to me by Kóhoi and other teachers- just one verb each.

One might say that this culture has, for complex cultural/linguistic reasons, declined to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and appears to be quite the happier for it.

Incidental links:

• Discussion of California's budget mess
• "God, he's moody"
• Good discussion of the historicity of Jesus, especially on the guest's side

Explaining away

What constitutes an explanation?

Correspondent Eric Reitan makes a provocative point in an interview (ignore the first 5 minutes) and elsewhere, that the naturalistic world view has to explain away many realities (such as religious belief and ideas) in a way that does not do it credit. If we just took our inner experiences more seriously, (not assigning them to "the brain" and related scientific accounts, sometimes further derided as "scientistic"), they would be taken to point to realities as real as the much-vaunted "empirical" realities of modern scientific naturalism.

The most popular form of naturalism today extends a preferential bias to empirical experience. It begins with the assumption that only experience of this sort is veridical (that is, it assumes that only experience of this sort connects the subject to a reality “out there,” tracking it in such a way that one can learn about that reality through the kind of careful examination of the content of the experience that scientists engage in). It then constructs an account of reality on the basis of this kind of experience alone. And when other kinds of experience, were they to be treated as veridical, would require one to posit orders of reality transcending this “naturalistic” account, naturalism explains away these other experiences as epiphenomenal by-products of entities whose reality is endorsed by the naturalist metaphysics (e.g., the brain).

Hence, for example, my immediate sense of my daughter’s intrinsic value is not treated as an experience of something real “out there.” Since there is nothing in the naturalistic account of reality that corresponds to “intrinsic value,” the experience I am having is explained away as nothing but an inner psychological phenomenon, a product of brain activity whose neural subroutines probably evolved because of their role in promoting reproductive fitness.

As Reitan says, naturalism has a working model (though partial) for how emotions like his regard for his daughter arise. They come from specific locations like the amygdala upon the perception of things we are highly attached to- attachment that arises from prior learning and memory. People have been known to assign such value to pet rocks or to blankets. The subjective feeling consists of brain activity, though we do not have an account of exactly how that relation works- what qualia or conscousness really "is", bridging the subjective / objective divide. But much of the circuitry is clear, and the study of oxytocin gives a compelling example of the chemical underpinning of social bonding, helping explain its mechanism and origin.

Is that an explanation? People with strokes and dementia lose this valuing connection to people they have known their whole lives. How can this connection and sense of value then be spoken of as real and "intrinsic", if it is actually ephemeral and mechanistic, however strongly felt? If it is a matter of computational data storage, just as the naturalistic account has it? Whether the naturalistic account is sufficient as an explanation of these emotions or not, it is certainly a necessary component. Even as advanced theists posit that god works "through" evolution, so must she work "through" the brain mechanisms to generate thoughts and emotions, leaving aside the question of whether the assumed external actuation makes any sense or is supported by any evidence.

Explanation is a process of creating a narrative of whatever it is that we wish to "understand", which is to say, creating an abstract model of a phenomenon that serves to simplify its workings and relations, hopefully to the extent that we can mentally project its activities backward and forward in time. That is the whole point of our big brains- to understand (or explain) social relations and other aspects of the world in order to bend them to our needs. To understand an episode of a TV show means that we have knowledge of the setting, the predicament, and the traits of the characters, such that we "get" why they conspire to defraud their friends, or whatever the plot developments happen to be.

Such understanding depends on accurate knowledge of all the components that make up the phenomenon- the causes and effects that surround it, which in turn make up a consistent model we can use to work with the phenomenon. That consistency is the hallmark of accurate models of reality versus other worlds of imagination and dream, since outer reality is both self-consistent and also is the object of our very extensive sensory capacities that give us a leg up in evaluating it (in contrast to our extremely poor internal senses). Thus the critical importance of empiricism when making explanations of "reality".

Do intuition and spritual feeling amount to other forms of "knowing", thus also to understanding and explanation? That is a tricky question. These ideas and feelings are certainly real subjectively. They exist. They are even "empirical experience". They may guide one to a correct model of reality. Our instincts and intuition can be incanny in their accuracy. Yet they can also lead us terribly astray. The sense of value you ascribe to another is a datum about you, but it is quite simply not a datum about the other. Rather it is a projection, which in our social world is all we have to rely on and is extremely important. But that projection is evanescent, and can turn (subjectively) into its opposite with tragic consequences, as dramas are only too ready to illustrate.

There is no way from the content of hunches, dreams, and visions alone to verify their correspondence with reality, even while they may be accompanied by the strongest possible "sense of truth". Intuition is a good bet in areas where it has been honed over evolutionary time- estimating how hard to throw a stone, guessing which plant might be edible, figuring whether to trust someone with your money. Science has shown time and again, however, that the farther a phenomenon from our common experience, the poorer intuition is in deeply understanding it.

Lightning is a simple example, where intuition leads directly to supernatural explanations, while the corrective of empirical science has substituted a more naturalistic one. Supernatural explanations have the virtue of extraordinary simplicity. For the cost of one mystical being or realm, all other mystifying phenomena can be swept under its rug. But they have little to do with reality or the consistency that is reality's hallmark, since they do not rely on detailed knowledge of the phenomena in question, nor on a system of logic in explaining it, other than the ad-hoc and jerry-rigged. Attempts to make such systems more "explanatory" end up with pantheons of gods and reams of myth, like those of ancient Greece, which in the end do more harm than good to the credibility of the enterprise, though they are highly entertaining.

But whyyyyy?

Like children driving a parent crazy, the last refuge of the theist is to say that for all that science tells us, it can not "explain" the really deep questions- why we exist and where our meaning lies. But these questions have been answered, (Darwin and all that ...), just not to the satisfaction of those who believe we have a purpose dictated by a higher being and communicated by way of maddeningly contradictory scriptures. Only if one imagines and assumes that we need a cosmic meaning does the question even arise. Far from being deep, these questions simply restate theism as an assumption rather than a hypothesis.

In the end, it seems cheap rhetoric to disparage detailed naturalistic explanations as "explaining away". If they are wrong, then impeach them on their merits and details. If they are right but not complete, then extend and deepen them. If their perspective is different from your own, then put up your own explanatory narrative to compete on the merits of clarification, unification, and predictive value (and empirical detail), keeping in mind the premises that you are importing and their plausibility. The only improvement to be made on a bad explanation is a better one, since explanations are by definition our mental narratives of all phenomena.

It is particularly wrong-headed to fault science on its explanations of human cognition, just when it is making so much progress. The impulse to tap "transcendent orders of reality" to account for our behavior and thoughts completely ignores the bounds of basic biology and physics, and takes the experience of consciousness as a fundamentally inexplicable and mystical datum, which it is not. Articles just in the last month have tackled the computation of social behavior and the nature of cognitive attention by way of long-range gamma wave coupling across the brain, each of which speak to our regard for our children, among other things. The extraordinary resistance of theists to regarding themselves as computational machines will lead them to grief as this last bastion of mysticism and human special-ness is breached by serious explanations.

• Evolutionary psychology explained.
• Religion explained.

American Taliban

A long-standing campaign of intimidation, terror, and killing ... forgive my anger about it.

Much was made of the "American Taliban"- Silver Spring and Marin county-raised John Walker (now Hamza) Lindh, who in a fit of teenage spiritual seeking wound up in Afghanistan fighting with the Taliban. He joined a fundamentalist movement clothed in religious garb dealing death and oppression to all who came in contact with it. Lindh was a part of the Taliban, but not part of an American Taliban. For that, we need to look at the anti-abortion movement.

Of all the fixations of the right, this is surely the most fixed and relentless. Just as the Taliban sought a re-norming of society in Afghanistan and now in Pakistan, including the definitive oppression of women, adherence to a fantastical interpretation of Islam, all covering a lust for absolute power, fundamentalist Christians seek a renorming of American society, extensive regression in women's rights, schooling in accordance with a fantastical interpretation of the Bible, all covering a lust for absolute power, signaled by their formula that ours is a "Christian nation".

For all its talk of love and life, the right is tellingly served by its media, which massages its erogenous hate-zones with talk radio and FOX news, including numerous incitements to attack abortion providers such as George Tiller. How different is this from the mosques in Europe and elsewhere that stream denunciations of the kaffir, hatred of the societies that host them, and all those opposed to the triumph of Islam? Where democracy demands reasoned debate premised on pragmatic grounds of mutual understanding and forbearance, the right cleaves to authoritarianism and absolutism, yearning for an emotionally secure hierarchy of God in his heaven, (Republican) president in his White House, pastor in his church, and father in his family. Patriarchy is central to the emotional needs of traditionalists, leading to their various fixations- on executive power, on the imagined absolute morals of religion, and on the "proper role" of women.

The quiverfull movement is a fascinating example of this mind-set, going far beyond home-schooling and stocking the basement for the apocalypse, to a complete subjugation of the women to be barefoot and pregnant, to spend their lives raising children, satisfying their men, submitting to his every decision, and "opening" their wombs to the lord's desires, be He celestial or domestic.

But it is with abortion that the right has found its most potent issue- a club with which to bludgeon the larger secular culture. If framed solely around the fetus, it is a heinous act, expecially if one posits that conception conjures an everlasting soul which will meet and reprove its mother in the hereafter (fathers, well, they get off scot free, I believe). But what of the mother's frame- a mother who may not want, or can not have, another child, who had accidental sex, who may want to plan for children farther in the future, who in any case is far more sentient and morally valuable than the fetus she carries? (Or is she? The right might say otherwise.) The extremists insist on seeing the dilemma through one frame only when it suits their political agitation, though when their own daughters get into difficulties, it suddenly becomes a personal choice.

The moral calculus is not black and white. Life is increasingly valuable as it is developed, raised, educated, and conscious. Making a fetish of fetuses that have meager or no consciousness or ability to suffer is to create a peculiar imbalance in the moral order. And the point of this imbalance is as clear here as it is in Afghanistan- to disempower women. Rightists want to treat women as vessels, as fields planted with the male seed, as wombs whose most serious purpose is to carry children.

If the principle were truly to preserve and multiply all human life, it would in the first place be abhorrent, since there is already an excess of human life on the planet, from which we need to find some way to climb down as humanely as possible. Generating 12 billion, 24 billion, and more people as we are on a natural path to do will be catastrophic for humanity and for the biosphere- an unsustainable path that ends in monumental suffering. In the second place, rightists tend to be wildly inconsistent, cheering on killing in the form of death penalties and wars, (and apocalypses targeting the unrighteous), even while imagining themselves adherents of an iron-clad, absolute commandment to not kill.

As with the subtle workings of the muslim hijab, the anti-abortion movement has even enlisted women in their own disempowerment, playing on their compassion and love as a front for asking the state to tell all women that once they are successfully impregnated, they must lose control of their bodies and destinies. Why the boundary must be at the point of conception, and not the production of eggs, or sperm, is somewhat mysterious- they are all potential life, all vulnerable to heartless disregard. Now it turns out that all the cells of our bodies are potential new life, by the miracle of cloning technology. Is it immoral to discard skin cells?

The status of women evokes deep-seated feelings. Indeed if any feelings can be said to be "deeply held", it would be these. The Catholic church makes a fetish of Mary as inert immaculate mother, while denegrating women's capacities for spiritual experience and leadership, indeed banning them from office, and not only opposing abortion, but also opposing condom use, as if breeding like rabbits (or sheep) were the highest lay aspiration.

In the US as elsewhere, opposition to abortion is a stalking horse for misogyny and patriarchy- the devaluation and oppression of women in the guise of saving innocent life, tradition, and nature itself. That is why the killing of George Tiller is not an isolated incident. It is part of an extremist effort to turn back the clock of the modern world using religiously cloaked campaign of intimidation, terror, and killing to send the women of America back into the shadows of hearth and home. The movement may tepidly distance itself from this particular killing and killer, but it has spent decades inciting his actions as it has terrorized and intimidated women, doctors, and politicians who disagree.

The status of women is one of the most important global issues of our day and of the future. It is women who scare the heck out of the Afghan Taliban (and the Saudi monarchy, and the Iranian mullahs, etc.) and will break its back politically if given the chance. It is empowered women who care for their children enough to have few rather than many, advancing both human development and environmental protection, and it is empowered women who bring peace to world politics, putting compassion and sustainability over competitiveness and conflict.

• Tom Tomorrow considers this modern world
• Ellen Goodman on the larger picture of intimidation
• Frank Rich gets it too
• Gosh- perhaps we do have a problem, after all
• But let's not overreact or anything
• What did Tiller do?
• Douthat on compromise
• Phenomenal lecture on religion and the human condition, by Robert Sapolsky
• Fascinating meditation on work and meaning
• And remember to ditch that cable TV

Tempest in a nonspatial entity

Reply to Eric Reitan's defense of Goetz and Taliaferro

I've been honored by the attention of the author of the book "Is God a Delusion?", one of the many replies to Richard Dawkins and the new atheists. Eric Reitan is a philosopher and professor at Oklahoma State, and blogs at The piety that lies between, whose title is a reference to Plutarch, as well as to one founder of liberal theology, Friedrich Schleiermacher.

He expresses some appreciation and differences with my post on the spiritual atheist, on my post against theology, and most incisively, on my review of the book Naturalism by Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (G&T) which defends the idea of a supernatural soul. I'll reply to his points about this book here, to bring this discussion to a higher level, as it deserves.

I'll grant that I did not fathom all the jargon swirling within this book. I quoted three instances of what I believed to be egregious nonsense, and Reitan maintains that it is just when the jargon gets thickest that the work is most lucid. Seeing as he believes the purpose of the book is to "jar academics back to work", it should to be accessible to them- not just to specialists, but especially to the naturalists who wear the supposed blinders that predispose them against supernaturalism, such as myself, for instance.

I would not represent myself as a philosopher but as an educated layperson and scientist, capable of dealing with considerable thickets of jargon. I also labor under not having the book at hand, having borrowed it from the library (but will make some use of G&T's responses online). All the same, I think I can still say that G&T were egregiously unclear in an area that is, frankly, not rocket science.

To propose supernatural entities is to free oneself from any logical bounds: whether point-like or distributed, whether intuitive or counter-intuitive, there is no restriction at all on one's theorizing in this area, other than the points at which it contacts reality- the presumed interactions that the nonspatial entity (soul) has with our brains- causal, confined to one individual, confined in time, etc. I do not think one can point to any necessary condition of G&T's supernatural model that is not necessitated by empirical facts. Logic can not create bounds in this sphere- the nonspatial entity could be any size, any where, have any properties whatsoever, as long as it does not violate the empirically evident consciousness functions.

I could just as well propose that Peter Pan pushes around the earth's tectonic plates. There is no end of jargon I could devise to "clarify" how this might take place. But without engaging in the science at the reality-based end of this interaction, (as G&T do not do in the case of neuroscience), I would have no logical bounds on my models, and would be free to write another book about how I now think it is not Peter Pan after at all, but Poseidon who is responsible.

The basic point is that there is a reason to take the naturalist position- it eschews fantasy in deference to reality. That humans (especially children) are congenitally prone to jump to conclusions (or assumptions), including the wide-open field of supernatural conclusions, is no reason to give them philosophical credence. G&T in their web responses reiterate that "This commitment drives the naturalist’s world view and leads naturalists to question and deny the reality of how things appear to ordinary human beings." As mentioned in my original review, this is no philosophical justification for their premise, despite the smoothly expressed "reality" of this ordinary view. Ordinary human beings regard the sun as travelling through the sky and species as fixed types. Ordinary understanding does need to be explained (and corrected), but it is not a source of explanation, especially when conflicting so flagrantly with other logic and observation.

So the claim of doing "metaphysics" is not helpful in freeing the philosopher from dealing with reality. Either the system proposed agrees with reality, or it is an idea untethered from it. The test is empirical (defining "truthiness", to put it in lay terms), and every empirical indication we have is that when you chop off someone's head, their mind disappears promptly as well. Ditto for countless smaller interventions by drugs, lesions, strokes, electricity, etc. that affect aspects of consciousness.

Mathematics has a similar flexibility- one can make a mathematics of any assumptions one likes, and then strive to create a self-consistent system out of it. If that system is truly self-consistent (by way of proofs, etc.), then it stands a chance of describing aspects of the real world, since the real world is by necessity self-consistent. But that alone is no guarantee, the final test still being empirical. If the assumptions one gives oneself are completely free and without bound, however, then one is quite likely to end up in a morass of meaningless, or at any rate unnecessary, jargon and tangled thought, counting angels on the head of a pin.

Jargon aside, I think the first quote I pointed to from the book remains indefensible:

Hence, it does not seem the least bit implausible to say that a soul's thinking, choosing, experiencing pain, etc., are explainable in terms of its having the power to think and choose and exercising them, and its having the capacity to experience pain and its being actualized. (p.69).

Reitan calls the thinking behind this "neo-Aristotelian" and a "'causal ontology' that depends on a metaphysics of 'substances' with powers that derive from their 'natures'--thematically attuned to an older scholastic metaphysics". Why don't we use Aristotelian assumptions and scholastic metaphysics in modern thought outside of theology? Because they are completely vacuous. Why were the scholastics barren in their natural philosophy over hundreds of years? Because these assumptions don't productively work for anything having to do with outer reality, however closely they may cleave to psychological reality.

The basic point is that one can not just grant oneself assumptions. One has to examine, test, and judge one's assumptions at the deepest possible level. The naturalist shies from accepting a premise that is not reality-based and logic-based. The supernaturalist accepts "common understanding", causal open-ness, non-necessity of evidence, god, and other positions as starting points, each of which is philosophically impeachable. While this may count as just another pair of interpretive glasses in Reitan's book, there seems little reason to go down that path if the glasses are known to be mirrors instead of lenses. Putting on questionable or extravagant assumptions may be appropriate when exploring and teaching philosophical history, but it is no way to do philosophy.

For example, basic thermodynamics necessitates causal closure. The first law of thermodynamics about the conservation of energy is not just an assumption about reality, it is an observation that energy, in the forms of mass, energy, and information, can not be created from nothing and is interconvertable. There are no exceptions in the form of perpetual motion machines, etc. drawing data, energy, mass, etc. from outside reality (possibly excepting the origin of the universe itself, about which we are as yet profoundly ignorant). Thus to breezily propose causal open-ness and souls as supernatural entities that interact with brains, tell us what to do, etc. flies in the face of the most basic bedrock of physics, both theoretical and observed. The naturalist presupposition in this instance is not an option on the metaphysical smorgasbord, but a rather hard-won piece of empirical data.

Let me turn to some more specific notes Reitan provides on G&T:

For example, it is argued (by Sosa and others) that in order for A to causally influence B, A must first stand in a NONcausal relation with B that explains how and why A affects B as it does rather than something else (or nothing at all).

My understanding of this was that the non-causal relation was perhaps a term for a conceptual relation- one in our heads by which we make sense of the two entities in some narrative or model about their relationship which is causal in the real world. I may very well be wrong about this ... hard to tell. But it seems axiomatic that if there is a causal relation to physical objects, it should be empirically detectable, and that this would be the locus of investigation and controversy, not the armchair science that G&T offer. To reiterate, as far as the non-spatial, supernatural sphere of speculation goes, there are no intrinsic limits- the relations of A and B have no possible bounds or preconditions, interacting magically as far as we know.

[PS- After posting, I realized that I had mistaken this argument. Put concretely, two gears need to be physically close (noncausal relation) before they can induce movement in each other (causal relation). For the case of a nonspatial entity with no physical properties, one would be using purely fictive resources to describe these relations, especially if one failed to even attempt to account concretely for how the brain physically receives the signal. One might just as well resort to Star Trek tech-talk and claim that the soul and body interact over subspace (noncausal relation) by exchanging tachion pulses (causal relation).]

The passages you call gibberish all have the following in common: they presuppose their alternative metaphysical assumptions, in terms of causal powers rooted in a thing's nature. These alternative assumptions are in an important sense at odds with the assumptions that shape contemporary naturalism, assumptions which seek to understand things not in terms of a 'nature' conceived in Aristotelian terms (invoking the idea that a thing is a combination of FORM and MATTER, and that the nature of a thing is given by its FORM), but in terms of the interaction and organization of constituent physical parts--that is, reductionistically and spatio-temporally.

Right- I recognize that, but as above, it is worthwhile to analyze these assumptions at point blank, however deep and "embedded" they may be. Is thermodynamics correct? That is what naturalists assume, based not on scripture or common understanding, but on empiricism. Conversely, do we have reliable access to supernatural phenomena of any kind, or to things called "forms"? Not outside of our intuition, (aka "common understanding"), whose defects and predilections are all too obvious to the student of art, psychology, and comparative religion. Indeed the naturalistic world view and scientific method were primarily a psychological achievement, withdrawing the many projections elaborated in theology and prior philosophy and substituting for them critique by experiment and reason.

If you bring this latter metaphysic TO G&T's arguments, you are not merely begging the question but wearing a set of interpretive lenses which make it impossible to understand WHAT they are saying (and hence impossible to even begin the process of adequately assessing it).

I would be happy to grant that given all their assumptions, they make perfect, if extremely convoluted, sense. What their argument boils down to is that, given the assumption that we have souls and that super-nature exists, then we have souls with indeterminate properties and naturalism begins to look pretty silly. The argument is not at all whether their conclusions follow from their assumptions, but whether their assumptions make any sense, by the metric I hope we all share, which is congruence with reality, critically considered.

Here is a quote from web responses by G&T:

"We respectfully beg to differ. We never said that we posit the existence of the soul to fill an explanatory gap. Rather, we argued that there must be an explanatory gap in the physical world, given the existence of the soul and its choices to act. We are first convinced that the soul exists and makes libertarian choices for purposes and then go on to explain to our readers that the soul’s existence and causal activity implies that there must be a gap in the physical explanatory story."

I think it is pretty clear that they are going about this backwards. It is no surprise that if you posit souls, then the regular order of natural explanation leaves something to be desired. It is they who are not examining their assumptions, other than to lamely claim that they are following "common understandings".

The inescapable premise, it seems to me, is that science cannot discern whether there is more to reality than science can discern.

So, if we want to figure out what overarching metaphysics we should adopt, we need other considerations besides the scientific facts.

Here I have to disagree. The statement implies that reality can be defined in a way that exceeds "facts". But what would that difference be? G&T try to treat our common intuitions as facts of the highest order, from which we can conclude the existence of super-nature. But what of all the other facts that belie that same conclusion? Isn't this simply the privileging of one set of selected observations over a much more rigorous set of observations, based on their intimacy and affect?

In my view, their achievement lies in something else: reminding us that there is a research program here, and that a comprehensive worldview should be assessed not merely in terms of its 'fit' with science but with the totality of human experience, including the experience of ourselves as agents who act for reasons.

Indeed, this is where a truly scientific research program on human reasoning and volition will tell a great deal. My take on that research is that the intuitive ideas we have about will and authorship are being (or have already been) replaced by a paradigm that will explain them in a productive fashion- not explaining them away, but giving concrete accounts of their origin, mechanism, and role without impairing their subjective enjoyment. Thus one more long-cherished intuitive idea will go the way of so many before.

With that, I'll finish and return to the original topic of love and agree that the mystical religious experience generates in us love for the world, which is now so desperately needed. We needn't ask whether it loves us back- it might have a hard time doing so at this moment of ecological peril. In that respect the atheist may even agree with the doctrine of original sin- regarded as a perpetual duty we as conscious beings have to safeguard the unconscious source of our being from harm- especially including that harm caused by our own existence. Our consciousness is also our main hope, however- an expensive, hard-fought, rare, and precious achievement which may yet be of greater benefit to ourselves and our fellow creatures.

Dissection of the will

An experiment separates the threads of consciousness and action

One of the deepest sources of supernaturalism is the mystery of consciousness- the sense that our soul/spirit is so unmaterial, shiny, and pure that it could not possibly be sullied with evolutionary origins, messy neurological mechanisms, and eventual death. There is an undeniable and to some an unbridgeable tension between this remarkable experience and its rather obvious dependence on our brains.

One expression of this tension is the doctrine of "free will", which has two senses. One theological dilemma is, if god is so good and powerful, why are we not His obedient automata? Because He gave us free will, with which to be bad and yet also with which to worship Him, if we are smart, because he likes to be freely loved, not slavishly obeyed. Related to this theodicy is the second sense of free will- that our inmost soul yet still partakes somehow in the divine to the extent that it is immaterial, has a smidgen of moral knowledge (often ignored), and is eternal, even if, looking backward, it has its origin in a mysterious and divine implantation process concomitant with sperm and egg intromission.

At any rate, we feel free in our actions, while at the very same time physics tells us that no action happens without causes- causes that would obviate the felt authorship of our actions. The answer in scientific terms is to posit an "illusion of free will", where our actions, when not obvious responses to conscious exigencies, are caused by unconscious promptings which simultaneously arise in consciousness as 1: the idea which "pops" into one's head to move one's arm, and 2: the action itself, activated in parallel. In this scheme, our actions all have causes, just not always causes we are aware of. And the sense of authorship is a fiction conjured simultaneously as the actual causes activate planning and action.

The motor areas of the brain are known to form a crescent across the top midline from ear to ear, where past experiments have generated a "homunculus", or map of body parts moved by stimulating brain locations in this region. A completely separate sensory homunculus maps bodily sensations to brain locations, and is not involved in this work.

A group in France experimented on seven patients getting brain surgery for other reasons, stimulating the surfaces of their brains to figure out how actions arise and how they are perceived. Stimulation in the areas shaded purple below, which are in the motor area, caused body parts to move, but without any cognition that the person had caused the action, that they had wanted to cause the action, or indeed that the action had taken place at all.

Conversely, stimulation in the areas shaded yellow and orange below (the volitional field) caused patients to experience urges to begin an action, and at higher levels of stimulation, even the sensation they had carried out an action, though none had actually taken place. One patient, stimulated with 5 mA at site a in the figure, said "I felt a desire to lick my lips", while at 8 mA at the same location was quoted "I moved my mouth and talked, what did I say?" (Doubtless these quotes are translations from the French!) No action took place, however, and electrical EMG recording of the corresponding muscles gave no trace of any activity, confirming that the feeling the patients had was not connected to their bodies.

Locations of experimental stimulation, in the motor area (purple) and volitional area (orange, yellow), also called Broca areas 39 and 40. The SMA lies slightly forward of the motor area.

Of these two fields, the motor field is easier to understand. The output end of the process could be followed down the spinal chord and even to the muscles with electrical stimulation, creating actions authored by the experimenter rather than by the patient, who would have no sense of volition. The paper mentions that lesions in this area of the brain are sometimes associated with "patients who obstinately claim that they can move their paralyzed limbs." This paralysis is not physical but due to a disconnect between volition, which is intact, and motor execution, which is not. Additionally, the paralysis is not apparent to the patient, indicating that, as the paper hypothesizes, perception of action is more dependent on the internal sense of volition, which assumes as a matter of course that an action has taken place as planned, than on feedback from the body, surprisingly enough.

Tracking down the sense of will and authorship is more interesting. A consistent model is that a normal action engages a more extensive network of brain activity, of which only tiny portions were activated in these experiments. One terminus of a consciously or unconsciously generated action is the motor areas that actually control their fulfillment (purple), but another terminus elsewhere (yellow, orange) creates the consciousness first of wanting to do the action, and if intense enough, of having performed it. This second area may later integrate sensory feedback to enhance the sense of authorship and allow learning, but based on these experiments, this feedback is not critical to a sense of authorship, matching the conclusion of Wegner. The volitional area maps closely to the mid-brain regions that were pointed out in a recent blog to be the best guess for those responsible for consciousness.

There is another area adjacent to the motor field, called the supplemental motor area (SMA), where others have done experiments of this type. Here, electrical stimulation generates both what is sensed as an urge to perform an action contrary to one's will, and also, at higher currents, the action itself. The key distinction is that here, the urge is recognized to be contrary to the patient's will (as happens in various tic and involuntary movement syndromes), while stimulating the volitional area creates such will directly, without generating the action. The SMA may be a preparatory area for motor action, placed after the unconscious originating signal has separated between paths to the motor area and to the volition/will/feedback area, but still having partial input to non-volitional consciousness.

The bottom line is that the sense of authorship is conjured in an area of the brain that doesn't actually cause the action, but is a post-processing epiphenomenon. This sense is essential to learning, to a coherent sense of self, and to moral responsibility, but it is not causally essential. Given that the causes of action are often "reflex", or "spontaneous", or otherwise unconscious, it would require impossible circular logic to have our sense of authorship be mechanistically equivalent to actual authorship.

Incidental links

• Philosophy bites podcast does neuroscience- the senses, blindsight, mirror neurons, alienation, anarchic hand, bodily coherence, etc.
• New Yorker profiles neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran, who deals with paralysis and other neurological oddities.
• Science mag review of above paper.
• Feminist atheist activist ... Taslima Nasreen
• Supernaturalism explained, and podcast.

Peak food

Our food supply floats on an ocean of petroleum, whose peak is now.

Peak oil has become part of the common parlance: the time when global production of oil reaches an all-time peak, followed by inexorable decline. Whether that peak is now or a few years away, rising demand will outstrip supply and dramatically increase prices as soon as the economic system gets back to normal. An analysis of the oil price spikes of 2008 indicates that while some of the rise was due to speculation in a classic bubble, most was due to real supply-demand dynamics, (reflecting low demand elasticity), which will re-assert themselves soon enough.

The price spikes in oil encouraged the diversion of food (corn) to fuel (ethanol) in the US. This contributed to a spike in food prices around the world which caused quite a few political problems. Another connection between fuel and food is that modern agriculture is heavily fuel-intensive, using (in the case of corn) about 140 gallons of (fossil) fuel per acre. To put this in perspective, that is enough to drive a 25 mpg car from coast to coast in the US. One estimate puts fuels used in agriculture at three calories for every food calorie consumed, amounting in the US to ten percent of fuel use. Rising fuel scarcity and cost will increase costs of fertilizer, machinery, processing, and ultimately, food. Poor countries will be most susceptible, especially when the green revolution, which is strongly fossil fuel-based, meets high fuel prices in competition with wealthier users.

Food systems also face other limitations such as amounts of arable land and water. A great deal of irrigation water is pumped from aquifers that are rapidly depleting, and in some cases from fossil aquifers that will never be replenished. Climate change derived from the fossil fuels already consumed is altering the availability of arable land, reducing areas in the tropics where higher heat can cause outright desertification or make some crops impossible to grow, and re-scheduling major agricultural rivers that are fed by glaciers. At the same time, climate change may expand arable areas in northerly locations like Siberia. Erosion and desertification are reducing arable land all over the world, since the current monoculture practices, however conservatively practiced, draw down soil resources instead of building them up.

Another critical element is population. All of nature follows the biological imperative of over-reproduction, spending all immediately available resources on the next generation, which is in turn left to gather what resources it can from the environment. In our case, we have found ways to borrow spectacular amounts of resources from our surroundings that will never be there to support future generations. This certainly applies to fossil fuels, but also to other minerals and to ecological services from the oceans, air, forests, and soils that are being depleted with little thought for the long term. Over the last few centuries we have gotten used to exponential growth in population, which even with the rosiest possible assumptions is unsustainable.

One could conclude that our "developed" way of life is an elaborate ponzi scheme- a lonely peak in earth's human population history, never to be repeated and foretelling harsh conditions on the declining side. Will such harsh conditions be required to restrict human population? Sadly, one has to say that the answer seems to be yes. There is little evidence that human societies are sufficiently conscious of truly long-term sustainability issues to be able to tear themselves away from our well-programmed biological imperatives. Certainly the Pope has no compunction urging continued fertility even in the poorest and most ecologically devastated precincts of his flock. It is only the modern development (and female empowerment) process that values quality over quantity in human reproduction, but at the same time it is the very process that eats us out of house and home in other ways.

Can technology make up the shortfall in resources, especially in energy, as well as mitigate the fallout of ecological devastation? That is not yet clear. Economists tend to be perennial optimists, assuming that, given the right incentives, our rich technological culture will create replacement commodities, in this case literally out of thin air. But just how extreme will those incentives have to get? Will they degrade our ability to live in developed ways? Will they prompt wars for food, water, and fuel? If the green revolution that has been so dependent on leveraging fossil fuels stalls, will poor countries face demographic catastrophe?

Right now the most daunting challenge will be resisting the temptation to double-down on this grand ponzi scheme, mortgaging yet more future resources and biosphere health by fleeing to even dirtier and climate-killing fossil fuels such as tar-sands, oil shales, and coal. That is the ultimate collective question- whether we can rise above what looks in bare economic terms to be an almost inexorable tragedy of the commons by collectively safeguarding earth's environment for those (perhaps fewer) humans and other inhabitants who succeed us.

Incidental links:

• Black sun takes a rosier view of the technological possibilities
• While others are more alarmist
• Liberals have their own angle on the taking-to-the-hills movement
• Easter Island offers a classic cautionary tale
• More data on peak oil
• And in completely other news, corruption continues apace